N.J.S.A. Criminal Law 2C Statute Codes

The New Jersey Criminal Code of Justice

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Last updated 2018

2C:1-4. Classes of offenses
a. An offense defined by this code or by any other statute of this State, for which a sentence of imprisonment in excess of 6 months is authorized, constitutes a crime within the meaning of the Constitution of this State. Crimes are designated in this code as being of the first, second, third or fourth degree.

b. An offense is a disorderly persons offense if it is so designated in this code or in a statute other than this code. An offense is a petty disorderly persons offense if it is so designated in this code or in a statute other than this code. Disorderly persons offenses and petty disorderly persons offenses are petty offenses and are not crimes within the meaning of the Constitution of this State. There shall be no right to indictment by a grand jury nor any right to trial by jury on such offenses. Conviction of such offenses shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.

c. An offense defined by any statute of this State other than this code shall be classified as provided in this section or in section 2C:43-1 and, except as provided in section 2C:1-5b and chapter 43, the sentence that may be imposed upon conviction thereof shall hereafter be governed by this code. Insofar as any provision outside the code declares an offense to be a misdemeanor when such offense specifically provides a maximum penalty of 6 months' imprisonment or less, whether or not in combination with a fine, such provision shall constitute a disorderly persons offense.

d. Subject to the provisions of section 2C:43-1, reference in any statute, rule, or regulation outside the code to the term "high misdemeanor" shall mean crimes of the first, second, or third degree and reference to the term "misdemeanor" shall mean all crimes.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-4, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; L.1981, c. 290, s. 1, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:1-6 Time limitations.

2C:1-6. Time Limitations. a. (1) A prosecution for any offense set forth in N.J.S.2C:11-3, N.J.S.2C:11-4, N.J.S.2C:14-2 or sections 1 through 5 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-1 through C.2C:38-5) may be commenced at any time.

(2) A prosecution for any offense set forth in N.J.S.2C:17-2, section 9 of P.L.1970, c.39 (C.13:1E-9), section 20 of P.L.1989, c.34 (C.13:1E-48.20), section 19 of P.L.1954, c.212 (C.26:2C-19), section 10 of P.L.1984, c.173 (C.34:5A-41), or section 10 of P.L.1977, c.74 (C.58:10A-10) may be commenced at any time.

b. Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitations:

(1)A prosecution for a crime must be commenced within five years after it is committed;

(2) A prosecution for a disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense must be commenced within one year after it is committed;

(3) A prosecution for any offense set forth in N.J.S.2C:27-2, N.J.S.2C:27-4, N.J.S.2C:27-6, N.J.S.2C:27-7, N.J.S.2C:29-4, N.J.S.2C:30-2, N.J.S.2C:30-3, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense, must be commenced within seven years after the commission of the offense;

(4) A prosecution for an offense set forth in N.J.S.2C:14-3 or N.J.S.2C:24-4, when the victim at the time of the offense is below the age of 18 years, must be commenced within five years of the victim's attaining the age of 18 or within two years of the discovery of the offense by the victim, whichever is later;

(5)(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.131).

c. An offense is committed either when every element occurs or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated. Time starts to run on the day after the offense is committed, except that when the prosecution is supported by physical evidence that identifies the actor by means of DNA testing or fingerprint analysis, time does not start to run until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA or fingerprint evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence.

d. A prosecution is commenced for a crime when an indictment is found and for a non-indictable offense when a warrant or other process is issued, provided that such warrant or process is executed without unreasonable delay. Nothing contained in this section, however, shall be deemed to prohibit the downgrading of an offense at any time if the prosecution of the greater offense was commenced within the statute of limitations applicable to the greater offense.

e. The period of limitation does not run during any time when a prosecution against the accused for the same conduct is pending in this State.

f. The limitations in this section shall not apply to any person fleeing from justice.

g. Except as otherwise provided in this code, no civil action shall be brought pursuant to this code more than five years after such action accrues.

Amended 1979, c.178, s.5; 1980, c.105, s.1; 1986, c.166; 1988, c.68; 1989, c.228, s.1; 1994, c.53; 1996, c.22; 1997, c.325, s.1; 2001, c.308; 2002, c.26, s.7; 2007, c.131.

2C:1-8. Method of prosecution when conduct constitutes more than one offense
Method of Prosecution When Conduct Constitutes More Than One Offense.

a. Prosecution for multiple offenses; limitation on convictions. When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if:

(1) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection d. of this section;

(2) One offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit the other;

(3) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or

(4) The offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct. The provisions of this paragraph (4) of subsection a. of this section or any other provision of law notwithstanding, no State tax offense defined in Title 54 of the Revised Statutes or Title 54A of the New Jersey Statutes, as amended and supplemented, shall be construed to preclude a prosecution for any offense defined in this code.

A determination barring multiple convictions shall be made by the court after verdict or finding of guilt.

b. Limitation on separate trials for multiple offenses. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple criminal offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court.

c. Authority of court to order separate trials. When a defendant is charged with two or more criminal offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, the court may order any such charges to be tried separately in accordance with the Rules of Court.

d. Conviction of included offense permitted. A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged whether or not the included offense is an indictable offense. An offense is so included when:

(1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or

(2) It consists of an attempt or conspiracy to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.

e. Submission of included offense to jury. The court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense.

L.1978, c.95; amended by L. 1979, c. 178, s. 6; 1981, c. 290, s. 2; 1987, c. 76, s. 30.

2C:1-13. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt; affirmative defenses; burden of proving fact when not an element of an offense
a. No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.

b. Subsection a. of this section does not:

(1) Require the disproof of an affirmative defense unless and until there is evidence supporting such defense; or

(2) Apply to any defense which the code or another statute requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence or such other standard as specified in this code.

c. A defense is affirmative, within the meaning of subsection b.(1) of this section, when:

(1) It arises under a section of the code which so provides; or

(2) It relates to an offense defined by a statute other than the code and such statute so provides; or

d. When the application of the code depends upon the finding of a fact which is not an element of an offense, unless the code otherwise provides:

(1) The burden of proving the fact is on the prosecution or defendant, depending on whose interest or contention will be furthered if the finding should be made; and

(2) The fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the court or jury, as the case may be.

e. When the code or other statute defining an offense establishes a presumption with respect to any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the meaning accorded it by the law of evidence.

f. In any civil action commenced pursuant to any provision of this code the burden of proof shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:1-13, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

 

2C:2-2. General requirements of culpability
a. Minimum requirements of culpability. Except as provided in subsection c.(3) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.

b. Kinds of culpability defined.

(1) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. "With purpose," "designed," "with design" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.

(2) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. "Knowing," "with knowledge" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.

(3) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. "Recklessness," "with recklessness" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.

(4) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. "Negligently" or "negligence" when used in this code, shall refer to the standard set forth in this section and not to the standards applied in civil cases.

c. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements.

(1) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.

(2) Substitutes for kinds of culpability. When the law provides that a particular kind of culpability suffices to establish an element of an offense such element is also established if a person acts with higher kind of culpability.

(3) Construction of statutes not stating culpability requirement. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with the culpability defined in paragraph b.(2) of this section. This provision applies to offenses defined both within and outside of this code.

d. Culpability as to illegality of conduct. Neither knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the code so provides.

e. Culpability as determinant of grade of offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or criminally negligently, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 290, s. 4, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:2-6. Liability for conduct of another; complicity
a. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.

b. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:

(1) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;

(2) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the code or by the law defining the offense;

(3) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense; or

(4) He is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.

c. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:

(1) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense; he

(a) Solicits such other person to commit it;

(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or

(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or

(2) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.

d. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.

e. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:

(1) He is a victim of that offense;

(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or

(3) He terminates his complicity under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation as defined in section 2C:5-1 d. prior to the commission of the offense. Termination by renunciation is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence.

f. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:2-7. Liability of corporations and persons acting, or under a duty to act, in their behalf
a. A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:

(1) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation unless the offense is one defined by a statute which indicates a legislative purpose not to impose criminal liability on corporations. If the law governing the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;

(2) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or

(3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation.

b. As used in this section:

(1) "Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program;

(2) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation;

(3) "High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a corporation having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation.

c. In any prosecution of a corporation for the commission of an offense included within the terms of subsection a. (1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This paragraph shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.

d. Nothing in this section imposing liability upon a corporation shall be construed as limiting the liability for an offense of an individual by reason of his being an agent of the corporation.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:2-8. Intoxication
a. Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the offense.

b. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.

c. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease within the meaning of chapter 4.

d. Intoxication which (1) is not self-induced or (2) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Intoxication under this subsection must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

e. Definitions. In this section unless a different meaning plainly is required:

(1) "Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body;

(2) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of crime;

(3) "Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-8, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1983, c. 306, s. 1, eff. Aug. 26, 1983.

2C:2-10. Consent
a. In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

b. Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if:

(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or

(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a concerted activity of a kind not forbidden by law; or

(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 3 of the code.

c. Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by the code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:

(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or

(2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature of harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute an offense; or

(3) It is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-10, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

 

2C:2-12. Entrapment
a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in cooperation with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforcement official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:

(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or

(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.

b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.

c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:2-12, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-3. Execution of public duty
a. Except as provided in subsection b. of this section, conduct is justifiable when it is required or authorized by:

(1) The law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his duties;

(2) The law governing the execution of legal process;

(3) The judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal;

(4) The law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war; or

(5) Any other provision of law imposing a public duty.

b. The other sections of this chapter apply to:

(1) The use of force upon or toward the person of another for any of the purposes dealt with in such sections; and

(2) The use of deadly force for any purpose, unless the use of such force is otherwise expressly authorized by law.

c. The justification afforded by subsection a. of this section applies:

(1) When the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized by the judgment or direction of a competent court or tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal process, notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction of the court or defect in the legal process; and

(2) When the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized to assist a public officer in the performance of his duties, notwithstanding that the officer exceeded his legal authority.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-4 Use of force in self-protection.

2C:3-4. Use of Force in Self-Protection. a. Use of force justifiable for protection of the person. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.

b. Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.

(1) The use of force is not justifiable under this section:

(a)To resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer in the performance of his duties, although the arrest is unlawful, unless the peace officer employs unlawful force to effect such arrest; or

(b)To resist force used by the occupier or possessor of property or by another person on his behalf, where the actor knows that the person using the force is doing so under a claim of right to protect the property, except that this limitation shall not apply if:

(i)The actor is a public officer acting in the performance of his duties or a person lawfully assisting him therein or a person making or assisting in a lawful arrest;

(ii)The actor has been unlawfully dispossessed of the property and is making a reentry or recaption justified by section 2C:3-6; or

(iii) The actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm.

(2)The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm; nor is it justifiable if:

(a)The actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter; or

(b)The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take, except that:

(i)The actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial aggressor; and

(ii)A public officer justified in using force in the performance of his duties or a person justified in using force in his assistance or a person justified in using force in making an arrest or preventing an escape is not obliged to desist from efforts to perform such duty, effect such arrest or prevent such escape because of resistance or threatened resistance by or on behalf of the person against whom such action is directed.

(3)Except as required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity of using force when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.

c. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:3-5, N.J.S.2C:3-9, or this section, the use of force or deadly force upon or toward an intruder who is unlawfully in a dwelling is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that the force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself or other persons in the dwelling against the use of unlawful force by the intruder on the present occasion.

(2)A reasonable belief exists when the actor, to protect himself or a third person, was in his own dwelling at the time of the offense or was privileged to be thereon and the encounter between the actor and intruder was sudden and unexpected, compelling the actor to act instantly and:

(a)The actor reasonably believed that the intruder would inflict personal injury upon the actor or others in the dwelling; or

(b)The actor demanded that the intruder disarm, surrender or withdraw, and the intruder refused to do so.

(3)An actor employing protective force may estimate the necessity of using force when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, withdrawing or doing any other act which he has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1987, c.120, s.1; 1999, c.73.

2C:3-5. Use of force for the protection of other persons
a. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when:

(1) The actor would be justified under section 2C:3-4 in using such force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect; and

(2) Under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force; and

(3) The actor reasonably believes that his intervention is necessary for the protection of such other person.

b. Notwithstanding subsection a. of this section:

(1) When the actor would be obliged under section 2C:3-4 b. (2)(b) to retreat or take other action he is not obliged to do so before using force for the protection of another person, unless he knows that he can thereby secure the complete safety of such other person, and

(2) When the person whom the actor seeks to protect would be obliged under section 2C:3-4 b. (2)(b) to retreat or take similar action if he knew that he could obtain complete safety by so doing, the actor is obliged to try to cause him to do so before using force in his protection if the actor knows that he can obtain complete safety in that way; and

(3) Neither the actor nor the person whom he seeks to protect is obliged to retreat when in the other's dwelling to any greater extent than in his own.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:3-6. Use of force in defense of premises or personal property NJ Rev Stat § 2C:3-6 (2013) 
Use of Force in Defense of Premises or Personal Property. a. Use of force in defense of premises. Subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is in possession or control of premises or is licensed or privileged to be thereon and he reasonably believes such force necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises.

b. Limitations on justifiable use of force in defense of premises.

(1) Request to desist. The use of force is justifiable under this section only if the actor first requests the person against whom such force is used to desist from his interference with the property, unless the actor reasonably believes that:

(a) Such request would be useless;

(b) It would be dangerous to himself or another person to make the request; or

(c) Substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of the property which is sought to be protected before the request can effectively be made.

(2) Exclusion of trespasser. The use of force is not justifiable under this section if the actor knows that the exclusion of the trespasser will expose him to substantial danger of serious bodily harm.

(3) Use of deadly force. The use of deadly force is not justifiable under subsection a. of this section unless the actor reasonably believes that:

(a) The person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than under a claim of right to its possession; or

(b) The person against whom the force is used is attempting to commit or consummate arson, burglary, robbery or other criminal theft or property destruction; except that

(c) Deadly force does not become justifiable under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection unless the actor reasonably believes that:

(i) The person against whom it is employed has employed or threatened deadly force against or in the presence of the actor; or

(ii) The use of force other than deadly force to terminate or prevent the commission or the consummation of the crime would expose the actor or another in his presence to substantial danger of bodily harm. An actor within a dwelling shall be presumed to have a reasonable belief in the existence of the danger. The State must rebut this presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

c. Use of force in defense of personal property. Subject to the provisions of subsection d. of this section and of section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by such other person to commit theft, criminal mischief or other criminal interference with personal property in his possession or in the possession of another for whose protection he acts.

d. Limitations on justifiable use of force in defense of personal property.

(1) Request to desist and exclusion of trespasser. The limitations of subsection b. (1) and (2) of this section apply to subsection c. of this section.

(2) Use of deadly force. The use of deadly force in defense of personal property is not justified unless justified under another provision of this chapter.

L.1978, c.95; amended by L. 1987, c. 120, s. 2.

2C:3-9. Mistake of law as to unlawfulness of force or legality of arrest; reckless or negligent use of excessive but otherwise justifiable force; reckless or negligent injury or risk of injury to innocent persons - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:3-9 (2013)
a. The justification afforded by sections 2C:3-4 to 2C:3-7 is unavailable when:

(1) The actor's belief in the unlawfulness of the force or conduct against which he employs protective force or his belief in the lawfulness of an arrest which he endeavors to effect by force is erroneous; and

(2) His error is due to ignorance or mistake as to the provisions of the code, any other provisions of the criminal law or the law governing the legality of an arrest or search.

b. (Deleted by amendment; P.L.1981, c. 290.)

c. When the actor is justified under sections 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8 in using force upon or toward the person of another but he recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to innocent persons, the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards innocent persons.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:3-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 290, s. 6, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. Insanity is an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:4-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 11A, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:4-11. Immaturity excluding criminal conviction; transfer of proceedings to family court - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:4-11 (2013)
a. A person shall not be tried for or convicted of an offense if:

(1) At the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was less than 14 years of age, in which case the family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction unless pursuant to section 8 of the "New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice" the juvenile has demanded indictment and trial by jury; or

(2) At the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was 14, 15, 16 or 17 years of age, unless:

(a) The family court has no jurisdiction over him;

(b) The family court has, pursuant to section 7 of "New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice," entered an order waiving jurisdiction and referring the case to the county prosecutor for the institution of criminal proceedings against him;

(c) The juvenile has, pursuant to section 8 of the "New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice," demanded indictment and trial by jury.

b. No court shall have jurisdiction to try and convict a person of an offense if criminal proceedings against him are barred by subsection a. of this section. When it appears that a person charged with the commission of an offense may be of such an age that proceedings may be barred under subsection a. of this section, the court shall hold a hearing thereon, and the burden shall be on such person to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the proceeding is barred upon such grounds. If the court determines that the proceeding is barred, custody of the person charged shall be surrendered to the family court and the case, including all papers and processes relating thereto shall be transferred.

L.1978,c.95; amended 1982,c.77,s.32.

a. Definition of attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:

(1) Purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as a reasonable person would believe them to be;

(2) When causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing such result without further conduct on his part; or

(3) Purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.

b. Conduct which may be held substantial step under subsection a. (3). Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subsection a. (3) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose.

c. Conduct designed to aid another in commission of a crime. A person who engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime which would establish his complicity under section 2C:2-6 if the crime were committed by such other person, is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by such other person.

d. Renunciation of criminal purpose. When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection a. (2) or (3) of this section, it is an affirmative defense which he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. The establishment of such defense does not, however, affect the liability of an accomplice who did not join in such abandonment or prevention.

Within the meaning of this chapter, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim. Renunciation is also not complete if mere abandonment is insufficient to accomplish avoidance of the offense in which case the defendant must have taken further and affirmative steps that prevented the commission thereof.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:5-1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:5-2 Conspiracy. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:5-2 (2013)

2C:5-2. Conspiracy. a. Definition of conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1)Agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or

(2)Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

b.Scope of conspiratorial relationship. If a person guilty of conspiracy, as defined by subsection a. of this section, knows that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of conspiring with such other person or persons, whether or not he knows their identity, to commit such crime.

c.Conspiracy with multiple objectives. If a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship. It shall not be a defense to a charge under this section that one or more of the objectives of the conspiracy was not criminal; provided that one or more of its objectives or the means of promoting or facilitating an objective of the conspiracy is criminal.

d.Overt act. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime other than a crime of the first or second degree or distribution or possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as defined in chapter 35 of this title, unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.

e.Renunciation of purpose. It is an affirmative defense which the actor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he, after conspiring to commit a crime, informed the authority of the existence of the conspiracy and his participation therein, and thwarted or caused to be thwarted the commission of any offense in furtherance of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of criminal purpose as defined in N.J.S.2C:5-1d.; provided, however, that an attempt as defined in N.J.S.2C:5-1 shall not be considered an offense for purposes of renunciation under this subsection.

f.Duration of conspiracy. For the purpose of N.J.S.2C:1-6d.:

(1)Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when the crime or crimes which are its object are committed or the agreement that they be committed is abandoned by the defendant and by those with whom he conspired; and

(2)Such abandonment is presumed with respect to a crime other than one of the first or second degree if neither the defendant nor anyone with whom he conspired does any overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy during the applicable period of limitation; and

(3)If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated as to him only if and when he advises those with whom he conspired of his abandonment or he informs the law enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of his participation therein.

g.Leader of organized crime. A person is a leader of organized crime if he purposefully conspires with others as an organizer, supervisor, manager or financier to commit a continuing series of crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:41-1, provided, however, that notwithstanding 2C:1-8a. (2), a conviction of leader of organized crime shall not merge with the conviction of any other crime which constitutes racketeering activity under 2C:41-1. As used in this section, "financier" means a person who provides money, credit or a thing of value with the purpose or knowledge that it will be used to finance or support the operations of a conspiracy to commit a series of crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, including but not limited to the purchase of materials to be used in the commission of crimes, buying or renting housing or vehicles, purchasing transportation for members of the conspiracy or otherwise facilitating the commission of crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.17; 1981, c.167, s.3; 1981, c.290, s.10; 1981, c.511, s.1; 1987, c.106, s.4; 2002, c.26, s.8.

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2C:5-5. Burglar's tools - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:5-5 (2013) 
2C:5-5. Burglar's Tools.

a. Any person who manufactures or possesses any engine, machine, tool or implement adapted, designed or commonly used for committing or facilitating any offense in chapter 20 of this Title or offenses involving forcible entry into premises.

(1) Knowing the same to be so adapted or designed or commonly used; and

(2) With either a purpose so to use or employ it, or with a purpose to provide it to some person who he knows has such a purpose to use or employ it, is guilty of an offense.

b. Any person who publishes plans or instructions dealing with the manufacture or use of any burglar tools as defined above, with the intent that such publication be used for committing or facilitating any offense in chapter 20 of this Title or offenses involving forcible entry into premises is guilty of an offense.

The offense under a. or b. of this section is a crime of the fourth degree if the defendant manufactured such instrument or implements or published such plans or instructions; otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.18A; 1992,c.198,s.1.

2C:5-6. Motor vehicle master keys - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:5-6 (2013)
a. Any person who knowingly possesses a motor vehicle master key or device designed to operate a lock or locks on motor vehicles or to start a motor vehicle without an ignition key is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

b. Any person who offers or advertises for sale, sells or gives to any person other than those excepted in subsection c. a motor vehicle master key or device designed to operate a lock or locks on a motor vehicle or to start a motor vehicle without an ignition key is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

c. Subsection a. shall not apply to a law enforcement officer, constable, locksmith or dealer, distributor or manufacturer of motor vehicles or motor vehicle locks, a garage keeper, or a person engaged in the business of lending on the security of motor vehicles, or in the business of acquiring by purchase evidence of debt secured by interests in motor vehicles, and his employees and agents.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:5-6, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

No person charged with a crime of the fourth degree, a disorderly persons offense or a petty disorderly persons offense shall be required to deposit bail in an amount exceeding $2,500.00, unless the court finds that the person presents a serious threat to the physical safety of potential evidence or of persons involved in circumstances surrounding the alleged offense or unless the court finds bail of that amount will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required. The court may for good cause shown impose a higher bail; the court shall specifically place on the record its reasons for imposing bail in an amount exceeding $2,500.00.

L.1983, c. 423, s. 1, eff. Jan. 5, 1984.

2C:11-2. Criminal homicide - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:11-2 (2013)
a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in section 2C:11-5, causes the death of another human being.

b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:11-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 20, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:11-3. Murder.

a.Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:

(1)The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or

(2)The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or

(3)It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:

(a)Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and

(b)Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and

(c)Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and

(d)Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

b.(1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of this subsection, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.

(2)If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole.

(3)A person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:

(a)The victim is less than 14 years old; and

(b)The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or N.J.S.2C:14-3.

(4)Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, or, if the murder occurred during the commission of the crime of terrorism, any person who committed the crime of terrorism, shall be sentenced by the court to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, which sentence shall be served in a maximum security prison, if a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the following aggravating factors exist:

(a)The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;

(b)In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;

(c)The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;

(d)The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;

(e)The defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;

(f)The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;

(g)The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or the crime of contempt in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-9;

(h)The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;

(i)The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3;

(j)The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2;

(k)The victim was less than 14 years old; or

(l)The murder was committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2).

(5)A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall be sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.

c.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

d.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

e.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

f.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

g.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

h.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).

i.For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

j.In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide shall be permitted.

Amended 1979, c.178, s.21; 1981, c.290, s.12; 1982, c.111, s.1; 1985, c.178, s.2; 1985, c.478; 1992, c.5; 1992, c.76; 1993, c.27; 1993, c.111; 1993, c.206; 1994, c.132; 1995, c.123; 1996, c.115, s.1; 1997, c.60, s.1; 1998, c.25; 1999, c.209; 1999, c.294, s.1; 2000, c.88; 2002, c.26, s.10; 2007, c.204, s.1.

2C:11-4 Manslaughter. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:11-4 (2013)
2C:11-4. Manslaughter. a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter when:

(1)The actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life; or

(2)The actor causes the death of another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2. Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 which resulted in the death of another person. As used in this paragraph, "actor" shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle.

b.Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:

(1)It is committed recklessly; or

(2)A homicide which would otherwise be murder under section 2C:11-3 is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.

c.Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (2) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.21A; 1981, c.290, s.13; 1986, c.172, s.1; 1991, c.341, s.1; 2001, c.412.

2C:11-5 Death by auto or vessel. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:11-5 (2013)

2C:11-5. Death by auto or vessel.

a.Criminal homicide constitutes vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.

Proof that the defendant fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been without sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or was operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) shall give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way limit the conduct or conditions that may be found to constitute driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.

b.Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, vehicular homicide is a crime of the second degree.

(1)If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.

(2)The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50 or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.

(3)Vehicular homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:

(a)on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

(4)If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life, which period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person.

c.For good cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.

d.Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4.

As used in this section, "auto or vessel" means all means of conveyance propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

e.Any person who violates paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense, unless the defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information. Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this title.

amended 1981, c.312, s.1; 1983, c.39; 1984, c.212; 1985, c.97, s.1; 1988, c.75, s.1; 1989, c.211; 1991, c.237, s.1; 1995, c.285; 1999, c.185, s.1; 2003, c.143; 2012, c.22, s.1.

1.A motor vehicle operator who knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the scene of that accident under circumstances that violate the provisions of R.S.39:4-129 shall be guilty of a crime of the second degree if the accident results in the death of another person.

If the evidence so warrants, nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4 or vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5.

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4 or for vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 and a separate sentence shall be imposed upon each such conviction.

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provisions of law, when the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively.

For the purposes of this section, neither knowledge of the death nor knowledge of the violation are elements of the offense and it shall not be a defense that the operator of the motor vehicle was unaware of the death or of the provisions of R.S.39:4-129.

L.1997, c.111, s.1; amended 2003, c.55, s.2; 2007, c.83, s.1.

2C:12-1 Assault. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:12-1 (2013)

2C:12-1. Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:

(1)Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or

(2)Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

(3)Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.

b.Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:

(1)Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury; or

(2)Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

(3)Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

(4)Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm, as defined in section 2C:39-1f., at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or

(5)Commits a simple assault as defined in subsection a. (1), (2) or (3) of this section upon:

(a)Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer; or

(b)Any paid or volunteer fireman acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a fireman; or

(c)Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or

(d)Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver or other employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a member or employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board or any school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a school bus driver; or

(e)Any employee of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an employee of the division; or

(f)Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial duties or because of his status as a member of the judiciary; or

(g)Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or

(h)Any Department of Corrections employee, county corrections officer, juvenile corrections officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer or any sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority; or

(i)Any employee, including any person employed under contract, of a utility company as defined in section 2 of P.L.1971, c.224 (C.2A:42-86) or a cable television company subject to the provisions of the "Cable Television Act," P.L.1972, c.186 (C.48:5A-1 et seq.) while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties in regard to connecting, disconnecting or repairing or attempting to connect, disconnect or repair any gas, electric or water utility, or cable television or telecommunication service; or

(j)Any health care worker employed by a licensed health care facility to provide direct patient care, any health care professional licensed or otherwise authorized pursuant to Title 26 or Title 45 of the Revised Statutes to practice a health care profession, except a direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession; or

(k)Any direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession, provided that the actor is not a patient or resident at the facility who is classified by the facility as having a mental illness or developmental disability; or

(6)Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this subsection upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or

(7)Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or

(8)Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion. For purposes of this subsection, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer fireman, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and any law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or

(9)Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or

(10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection v. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate, threaten or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or

(11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting system or device, against a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority. As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or device" means any system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the firearm.

Aggravated assault under subsections b. (1) and b. (6) is a crime of the second degree; under subsections b. (2), b. (7), b. (9) and b. (10) is a crime of the third degree; under subsections b. (3) and b. (4) is a crime of the fourth degree; and under subsection b. (5) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree. Aggravated assault under subsection b.(8) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree. Aggravated assault under subsection b. (11) is a crime of the third degree.

c. (1) A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly.

(2)Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and bodily injury results.

(3)Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the second degree if serious bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:

(a)on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel in violation of this paragraph.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (3) of this subsection.

It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

(4)Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and bodily injury results. For purposes of this paragraph, "driving a vehicle in an aggressive manner" shall include, but is not limited to, unexpectedly altering the speed of the vehicle, making improper or erratic traffic lane changes, disregarding traffic control devices, failing to yield the right of way, or following another vehicle too closely.

As used in this section, "vessel" means a means of conveyance for travel on water and propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

d.A person who is employed by a facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. of this section upon an institutionalized elderly person as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

e.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).

f.A person who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of subsection a. of this section in the presence of a child under 16 years of age at a school or community sponsored youth sports event is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. The defendant shall be strictly liable upon proof that the offense occurred, in fact, in the presence of a child under 16 years of age. It shall not be a defense that the defendant did not know that the child was present or reasonably believed that the child was 16 years of age or older. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to create any liability on the part of a participant in a youth sports event or to abrogate any immunity or defense available to a participant in a youth sports event. As used in this act, "school or community sponsored youth sports event" means a competition, practice or instructional event involving one or more interscholastic sports teams or youth sports teams organized pursuant to a nonprofit or similar charter or which are member teams in a youth league organized by or affiliated with a county or municipal recreation department and shall not include collegiate, semi-professional or professional sporting events.

amended 1979, c.178, s.22; 1981, c.290, s.14; 1983, c.101; 1985, c.97, s.2; 1985, c.444; 1990, c.87, s.1; 1991, c.237, s.2; 1991, c.341, s.2; 1993, c.219, s.2; 1995, c.6, s.1; 1995, c.181; 1995, c.211, s.1; 1995, c.307, s.2; 1997, c.42; 1997, c.119; 1999, c.77; 1999, c.185, s.2; 1999, c.281; 1999, c.381; 2001, c.215; 2001, c.443, s.2; 2002, c.53; 2003, c.218; 2005, c.2; 2006, c.78, s.2; 2010, c.109; 2012, c.3; 2012, c.16, s.6; 2012, c.22, s.2.

2C:12-1.1 Knowingly leaving scene of motor vehicle accident resulting in serious bodily injury, third degree crime. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:12-1.1 (2013)

2.A motor vehicle operator who knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the scene of that accident under circumstances that violate the provisions of R.S.39:4-129 shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree if the accident results in serious bodily injury to another person. The presumption of nonimprisonment set forth in N.J.S.2C:44-1 shall not apply to persons convicted under the provisions of this section.

If the evidence so warrants, nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude an indictment and conviction for aggravated assault or assault by auto under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:12-1.

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for aggravated assault or assault by auto under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:12-1 and a separate sentence shall be imposed upon each conviction.

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provisions of law, whenever in the case of such multiple convictions the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively.

For the purposes of this section, neither knowledge of the serious bodily injury nor knowledge of the violation are elements of the offense and it shall not be a defense that the driver of the motor vehicle was unaware of the serious bodily injury or provisions of R.S.39:4-129.

L.1997, c.111, s.2; amended 2003, c.55, s.3; 2007, c.83, s.2.

2C:12-2 Reckless endangerment. - 

2C:12-2. a. A person who purposely or knowingly does any act, including putting up a false light, which results in the loss or destruction of a vessel commits a crime of the third degree.

b.A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if he:

(1)Manufactures or sells a golf ball containing acid or corrosive fluid substance; or

(2)Purposely or knowingly offers, gives or entices any person to take or accept any treat, candy, gift, food, drink or other substance that is intended to be consumed which is poisonous, intoxicating, anesthetizing, tranquilizing, disorienting, deleterious or harmful to the health or welfare of such person, without the knowledge of the other person as to the identity and effect of the substance, except that it is a crime of the third degree if the actor violates the provisions of this paragraph with the purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of another criminal offense.

Notwithstanding the term of imprisonment provided under N.J.S. 2C:43-6, and the provisions of subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1, if a person is convicted of a crime of the fourth degree under paragraph (2) of this subsection, the sentence imposed shall include a fixed minimum sentence of not less than six months during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. If a person is convicted of a crime of the third degree under paragraph (2) of this subsection, the sentence imposed shall include a fixed minimum sentence of not less than eighteen months during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. The court may not suspend or make any other noncustodial disposition of that person. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provision of law, a conviction arising under this subsection shall not merge with a conviction for any offense that the defendant intended to commit or facilitate, when the defendant violated the provisions of this section, nor shall any such other conviction merge with a conviction under this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provision of law, the sentence for a crime of the third degree imposed pursuant to this paragraph shall be ordered to be served consecutively to that imposed for a conviction of the offense that the defendant intended to commit or facilitate when the defendant violated the provisions of this subsection.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1982, c.160 1999, c.335.

2C:12-3 Terroristic threats. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:12-3 (2013)

2C:12-3. Terroristic threats.

a.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience. A violation of this subsection is a crime of the second degree if it occurs during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. The actor shall be strictly liable upon proof that the crime occurred, in fact, during a declared period of national, State or county emergency. It shall not be a defense that the actor did not know that there was a declared period of emergency at the time the crime occurred.

b.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to kill another with the purpose to put him in imminent fear of death under circumstances reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1981, c.290, s.15; 2002, c.26, s.11.

2C:12-10 Definitions; stalking designated a crime; degrees. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:12-10 (2013)

1. a. As used in this act:

(1)"Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person; directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means, following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, or communicating to or about, a person, or interfering with a person's property; repeatedly committing harassment against a person; or repeatedly conveying, or causing to be conveyed, verbal or written threats or threats conveyed by any other means of communication or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.

(2)"Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.

(3)"Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress.

(4)"Cause a reasonable person to fear" means to cause fear which a reasonable victim, similarly situated, would have under the circumstances.

b.A person is guilty of stalking, a crime of the fourth degree, if he purposefully or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety or the safety of a third person or suffer other emotional distress.

c.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he commits the crime of stalking in violation of an existing court order prohibiting the behavior.

d.A person who commits a second or subsequent offense of stalking against the same victim is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

e.A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he commits the crime of stalking while serving a term of imprisonment or while on parole or probation as the result of a conviction for any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States.

f.This act shall not apply to conduct which occurs during organized group picketing.

L.1992, c.209, s.1; amended 1996, c.39, s.1; 1998, c. 17, s.3; 1999, c.47, s.1; 2001, c.220, s.2; 2009, c.28.

2C:13-4 Interference with custody. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:13-4 (2013)

2C:13-4. Interference with custody.

a.Custody of children. A person, including a parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian, is guilty of interference with custody if he:

(1)Takes or detains a minor child with the purpose of concealing the minor child and thereby depriving the child's other parent of custody or parenting time with the minor child; or

(2)After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting marriage or custody but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody and parenting time rights to a minor child, takes, detains, entices, or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of depriving the child's other parent of custody or parenting time, or to evade the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or

(3)After being served with process or having actual knowledge of an action affecting the protective services needs of a child pursuant to Title 9 of the Revised Statutes in an action affecting custody, but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining custody rights of a minor child, takes, detains, entices, or conceals the child within or outside the State for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of the courts of this State; or

(4)After the issuance of a temporary or final order specifying custody, joint custody rights or parenting time, takes, detains, entices, or conceals a minor child from the other parent in violation of the custody or parenting time order.

Interference with custody is a crime of the second degree if the child is taken, detained, enticed, or concealed: (i) outside the United States or (ii) for more than 24 hours. Otherwise, interference with custody is a crime of the third degree but the presumption of non-imprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for a first offense of a crime of the third degree shall not apply.

b.Custody of committed persons. A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if he knowingly takes or entices any committed person away from lawful custody when he is not privileged to do so. "Committed person" means, in addition to anyone committed under judicial warrant, any orphan, neglected, or delinquent child, person with a mental disease, defect, or illness, or other dependent or incompetent person, entrusted to another's custody by or through a recognized social agency or otherwise by authority of law.

c.It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection a. of this section, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, that:

(1)The actor reasonably believed that the action was necessary to preserve the child from imminent danger to his welfare. However, no defense shall be available pursuant to this subsection if the actor does not, as soon as reasonably practicable but in no event more than 24 hours after taking a child under his protection, give notice of the child's location to the police department of the municipality where the child resided, the office of the county prosecutor in the county where the child resided, or the Division of Child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families;

(2)The actor reasonably believed that the taking or detaining of the minor child was consented to by the other parent, or by an authorized State agency; or

(3)The child, being at the time of the taking or concealment not less than 14 years old, was taken away at his own volition and without purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the child.

d.It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subsection a. of this section that a parent having the right of custody reasonably believed he was fleeing from imminent physical danger from the other parent, provided that the parent having custody, as soon as reasonably practicable:

(1)Gives notice of the child's location to the police department of the municipality where the child resided, the office of the county prosecutor in the county where the child resided, or the Division of Child Protection and Permanency in the Department of Children and Families; or

(2)Commences an action affecting custody in an appropriate court.

e.The offenses enumerated in this section are continuous in nature and continue for so long as the child is concealed or detained.

f. (1) In addition to any other disposition provided by law, a person convicted under subsection a. of this section shall make restitution of all reasonable expenses and costs, including reasonable counsel fees, incurred by the other parent in securing the child's return.

(2)In imposing sentence under subsection a. of this section the court shall consider, in addition to the factors enumerated in chapter 44 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes:

(a)Whether the person returned the child voluntarily; and

(b)The length of time the child was concealed or detained.

g.As used in this section, "parent" means a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of a minor child.

amended 1979, c.178, s.25; 1982, c.199; 1990, c.104, s.1; 1997, c.299, s.7; 1999, c.190, s.2; 2006, c.47, s.25; 2011, c.232, s.2; 2012, c.16, s.8.

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2C:13-9 Second degree crime; penalties. Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:13-9 (2013)

5. a. A person commits a crime of the second degree if he:

(1) provides services, resources, or assistance with the knowledge that the services, resources, or assistance are intended to be used in furtherance of the commission of the crime of human trafficking in violation of section 1 of P.L.2005, c.77 (C.2C:13-8).

(a)For purposes of this paragraph, "services, resources, or assistance" shall include financial support, business services, lodging, transportation, the provision of false documentation or identification, equipment, facilities, or any other service or property with a pecuniary value that exceeds $200, whether or not a person is compensated for the services, resources, or assistance, but shall not include humanitarian or charitable aid or services provided directly to a victim of human trafficking.

(b)For purposes of this paragraph, the requisite knowledge that services, resources, or assistance are intended to be used in furtherance of the commission of the crime of human trafficking may be inferred if the defendant was aware that a person to whom the defendant was providing services, resources, or assistance: (i) was subject to or subjected another to restrictions on the person's freedom of movement, so that the person could not leave without accompaniment of another person or was otherwise subjected to obvious restrictions on mobility; or (ii) did not possess or have access to any means of communication, including but not limited to a cellular or other wireless telephone or other electronic communication device, and was not permitted or was otherwise unable to communicate with another person without supervision or permission; or

(2)procures or attempts to procure a person to engage in sexual activity as defined in paragraph (2) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:34-1, or to provide labor or services, whether for himself or another person, knowing that the person provided or to be provided was a victim of human trafficking, or under circumstances in which a reasonable person would conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the person was a victim of human trafficking.

(a)For purposes of this paragraph, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the defendant knew, and that a reasonable person would conclude there was a substantial likelihood, that a person was a victim of human trafficking if the person: (i) could not leave the premises where the person provided labor or services without accompaniment of another person or was otherwise subjected to significant restrictions on the person's freedom of movement; or (ii) did not possess or have access to any means of communication, including but not limited to a cellular or other wireless telephone or other electronic communication device, and was not permitted or was otherwise unable to communicate with another person without supervision or permission.

(b)For the purposes of this paragraph, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that: (i) a person knew that a child under the age of 18 years of age procured to engage in sexual activity or for whom attempts were made to procure for that activity was a victim of human trafficking; and (ii) a reasonable person would conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that a child under the age of 18 years of age procured to engage in sexual activity or for whom attempts were made to procure for that activity was a victim of human trafficking.

b. (1) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of this section that, during the time of the alleged commission of the crime, the defendant was a victim of human trafficking.

(2)There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a child under the age of 18 years of age charged with a violation of this section was a victim of human trafficking.

c. (1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a person convicted for a violation of this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which shall include a period of parole ineligibility of one-third to one-half of the term of imprisonment imposed or three years, whichever is greater. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-3, the sentence for a conviction under this section shall include a fine in an amount of not less than $15,000, which shall be collected as provided for the collection of fines and restitutions in section 3 of P.L.1979, c.396 (C.2C:46-4) and forwarded to the Department of the Treasury to be deposited in the "Human Trafficking Survivor's Assistance Fund" established by section 2 of P.L.2013, c.51 (C.52:17B-238).

(2)Additionally, upon a finding of guilt or entry of a guilty plea for a crime described under this section, the court shall direct any issuing State, county, or municipal governmental agency to revoke any license, permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of business or professional authorization required by law concerning the operation of that person's business or profession, if that business or profession was used in the course of the crime.

d.Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude, or limit in any way, the prosecution and conviction for any other offense, including prosecution and conviction pursuant to section 1 of P.L.2005, c.77 (C.2C:13-8), human trafficking, N.J.S.2C:34-1, prostitution and related offenses, and N.J.S.2C:2-6, liability for another's conduct.

L.2013, c.51, s.5.

2C:14-2 Sexual assault. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:14-2 (2013)

2C:14-2. Sexual assault. a. An actor is guilty of aggravated sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any one of the following circumstances:

(1)The victim is less than 13 years old;

(2)The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old; and

(a)The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree, or

(b)The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor's legal, professional, or occupational status, or

(c)The actor is a resource family parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis within the household;

(3)The act is committed during the commission, or attempted commission, whether alone or with one or more other persons, of robbery, kidnapping, homicide, aggravated assault on another, burglary, arson or criminal escape;

(4)The actor is armed with a weapon or any object fashioned in such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon and threatens by word or gesture to use the weapon or object;

(5)The actor is aided or abetted by one or more other persons and the actor uses physical force or coercion;

(6)The actor uses physical force or coercion and severe personal injury is sustained by the victim;

(7)The victim is one whom the actor knew or should have known was physically helpless, mentally incapacitated, or had a mental disease or defect which rendered the victim temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding the nature of his conduct, including, but not limited to, being incapable of providing consent.

Aggravated sexual assault is a crime of the first degree.

b.An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual contact with a victim who is less than 13 years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.

c.An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any one of the following circumstances:

(1)The actor uses physical force or coercion, but the victim does not sustain severe personal injury;

(2)The victim is on probation or parole, or is detained in a hospital, prison or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the actor's legal, professional or occupational status;

(3)The victim is at least 16 but less than 18 years old and:

(a)The actor is related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree; or

(b)The actor has supervisory or disciplinary power of any nature or in any capacity over the victim; or

(c)The actor is a resource family parent, a guardian, or stands in loco parentis within the household;

(4)The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and the actor is at least four years older than the victim.

Sexual assault is a crime of the second degree.

amended 1979, c.178, s.26; 1983, c.249, s.2; 1989, c.228, s.3; 1997, c.194, s.1; 2001, c.60; 2004, c.130, s.13; 2011, c.232, s.4

2C:14-4. Lewdness - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:14-4 (2013)
2C:14-4. Lewdness.

a. A person commits a disorderly persons offense if he does any flagrantly lewd and offensive act which he knows or reasonably expects is likely to be observed by other nonconsenting persons who would be affronted or alarmed.

b. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if:

(1) He exposes his intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person under circumstances where the actor knows or reasonably expects he is likely to be observed by a child who is less than 13 years of age where the actor is at least four years older than the child.

(2) He exposes his intimate parts for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person under circumstances where the actor knows or reasonably expects he is likely to be observed by a person who because of mental disease or defect is unable to understand the sexual nature of the actor's conduct.

c. As used in this section:

"lewd acts" shall include the exposing of the genitals for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of any other person.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1992,c.8,s.1.

2C:15-1. Robbery - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:15-1 (2013)
a. Robbery defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:

(1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or

(2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or

(3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree.

An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission.

b. Grading. Robbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.

L.1979, c. 178, s. 28, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 22, s. 1, eff. Feb. 6, 1981.

2C:17-3 Criminal mischief. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:17-3 (2013)

2C:17-3. a. Offense defined. A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he:

(1)Purposely or knowingly damages tangible property of another or damages tangible property of another recklessly or negligently in the employment of fire, explosives or other dangerous means listed in subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2; or

(2)Purposely, knowingly or recklessly tampers with tangible property of another so as to endanger person or property, including the damaging or destroying of a rental premises by a tenant in retaliation for institution of eviction proceedings.

b.Grading. (1) Criminal mischief is a crime of the third degree if the actor purposely or knowingly causes pecuniary loss of $2,000.00 or more.

(2)Criminal mischief is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500.00 but less than $2000.00. It is a disorderly persons offense if the actor causes pecuniary loss of $500.00 or less.

(3)Criminal mischief is a crime of the third degree if the actor damages, defaces, eradicates, alters, receives, releases or causes the loss of any research property used by the research facility, or otherwise causes physical disruption to the functioning of the research facility. The term "physical disruption" does not include any lawful activity that results from public, governmental, or research facility employee reaction to the disclosure of information about the research facility.

(4)Criminal mischief is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor damages, removes or impairs the operation of any device, including, but not limited to, a sign, signal, light or other equipment, which serves to regulate or ensure the safety of air traffic at any airport, landing field, landing strip, heliport, helistop or any other aviation facility; however, if the damage, removal or impediment of the device recklessly causes bodily injury or damage to property, the actor is guilty of a crime of the third degree, or if it recklessly causes a death, the actor is guilty of a crime of the second degree.

(5)Criminal mischief is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor interferes or tampers with any airport, landing field, landing strip, heliport, helistop or any other aviation facility; however if the interference or tampering with the airport, landing field, landing strip, heliport, helistop or other aviation facility recklessly causes bodily injury or damage to property, the actor is guilty of a crime of the third degree, or if it recklessly causes a death, the actor is guilty of a crime of the second degree.

(6)Criminal mischief is a crime of the third degree if the actor tampers with a grave, crypt, mausoleum or other site where human remains are stored or interred, with the purpose to desecrate, destroy or steal such human remains or any part thereof.

(7)Criminal mischief is a crime of the third degree if the actor purposely or knowingly causes a substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, supply of water, oil, gas or power, or other public service. Criminal mischief is a crime of the second degree if the substantial interruption or impairment recklessly causes death.

(8)Criminal mischief is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor purposely or knowingly breaks, digs up, obstructs or otherwise tampers with any pipes or mains for conducting gas, oil or water, or any works erected for supplying buildings with gas, oil or water, or any appurtenances or appendages therewith connected, or injures, cuts, breaks down, destroys or otherwise tampers with any electric light wires, poles or appurtenances, or any telephone, telecommunications, cable television or telegraph wires, lines, cable or appurtenances.

c.A person convicted of an offense of criminal mischief that involves an act of graffiti may, in addition to any other penalty imposed by the court, be required to pay to the owner of the damaged property monetary restitution in the amount of the pecuniary damage caused by the act of graffiti and to perform community service, which shall include removing the graffiti from the property, if appropriate. If community service is ordered, it shall be for either not less than 20 days or not less than the number of days necessary to remove the graffiti from the property.

d.As used in this section:

(1)"Act of graffiti" means the drawing, painting or making of any mark or inscription on public or private real or personal property without the permission of the owner.

(2)"Spray paint" means any paint or pigmented substance that is in an aerosol or similar spray container.

e.A person convicted of an offense of criminal mischief that involves the damaging or destroying of a rental premises by a tenant in retaliation for institution of eviction proceedings, may, in addition to any other penalty imposed by the court, be required to pay to the owner of the property monetary restitution in the amount of the pecuniary damage caused by the damage or destruction.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.30; 1981, c.290, s.17; 1991, c.336, s.1, 1995, c.20, s.2; 1995, c.251, s.1; 1998, c.54, s.1; 1999, c.95, s.1; 2005,c.316,s.1; 2005,c.319,s.5.

2C:18-2 Burglary. Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:18-2 (2013)

2C:18-2. Burglary. a. Burglary defined. A person is guilty of burglary if, with purpose to commit an offense therein or thereon he:

(1)Enters a research facility, structure, or a separately secured or occupied portion thereof unless the structure was at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter;

(2)Surreptitiously remains in a research facility, structure, or a separately secured or occupied portion thereof knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so; or

(3)Trespasses in or upon utility company property where public notice prohibiting trespass is given by conspicuous posting, or fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders.

b. Grading. Burglary is a crime of the second degree if in the course of committing the offense, the actor:

(1)Purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts, attempts to inflict or threatens to inflict bodily injury on anyone; or

(2)Is armed with or displays what appear to be explosives or a deadly weapon.

Otherwise burglary is a crime of the third degree. An act shall be deemed "in the course of committing" an offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit an offense or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission.

amended 1980, c.112, s.2; 1981, c.290, s.18; 1995, c.20, s.3; 2009, c.283, s.2.

2C:20-3. Theft by unlawful taking or disposition - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:20-3 (2013)
a. Movable property. A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof.

b. Immovable property. A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully transfers any interest in immovable property of another with purpose to benefit himself or another not entitled thereto.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:20-4. Theft by deception

2C:20-4. Theft by deception.

A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by deception. A person deceives if he purposely:

a.Creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind, and including, but not limited to, a false impression that the person is soliciting or collecting funds for a charitable purpose; but deception as to a person's intention to perform a promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform the promise;

b.Prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judgment of a transaction; or

c.Fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship.

The term "deceive" does not, however, include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing or exaggeration by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.

L.1978, c.95; amended 2003, c.43.

2C:20-5. Theft by extortion
A person is guilty of theft by extortion if he purposely and unlawfully obtains property of another by extortion. A person extorts if he purposely threatens to:

a. Inflict bodily injury on or physically confine or restrain anyone or commit any other criminal offense;

b. Accuse anyone of an offense or cause charges of an offense to be instituted against any person;

c. Expose or publicize any secret or any asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute;

d. Take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action;

e. Bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action, if the property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act;

f. Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or

g. Inflict any other harm which would not substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to materially harm another person.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs b, c, d or f that the property obtained was honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstances or as lawful compensation for property or services.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:20-5, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 34, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:20-7 Receiving stolen property. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:20-7 (2013)

2C:20-7. Receiving Stolen Property.

a.Receiving. A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly receives or brings into this State movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it is probably stolen. It is an affirmative defense that the property was received with purpose to restore it to the owner. "Receiving" means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property.

b.Presumption of knowledge. The requisite knowledge or belief is presumed in the case of a person who:

(1)Is found in possession or control of two or more items of property stolen on two or more separate occasions; or

(2)Has received stolen property in another transaction within the year preceding the transaction charged; or

(3)Being a person in the business of buying or selling property of the sort received, acquires the property without having ascertained by reasonable inquiry that the person from whom he obtained it had a legal right to possess and dispose of it; or

(4)Is found in possession of two or more defaced access devices; or

(5)Is found in possession of property of a cargo carrier without proper documentation or other evidence of right to possession.

amended 1979, c.178, s.35; 1981, c.290, s.19; 1997, c.6, s.3; 2013, c.58, s.3.

2C:20-11 Shoplifting. Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:20-11 (2013)
a.Definitions. The following definitions apply to this section:

(1)"Shopping cart" means those push carts of the type or types which are commonly provided by grocery stores, drug stores or other retail mercantile establishments for the use of the public in transporting commodities in stores and markets and, incidentally, from the stores to a place outside the store;

(2)"Store or other retail mercantile establishment" means a place where merchandise is displayed, held, stored or sold or offered to the public for sale;

(3)"Merchandise" means any goods, chattels, foodstuffs or wares of any type and description, regardless of the value thereof;

(4)"Merchant" means any owner or operator of any store or other retail mercantile establishment, or any agent, servant, employee, lessee, consignee, officer, director, franchisee or independent contractor of such owner or proprietor;

(5)"Person" means any individual or individuals, including an agent, servant or employee of a merchant where the facts of the situation so require;

(6)"Conceal" means to conceal merchandise so that, although there may be some notice of its presence, it is not visible through ordinary observation;

(7)"Full retail value" means the merchant's stated or advertised price of the merchandise;

(8)"Premises of a store or retail mercantile establishment" means and includes but is not limited to, the retail mercantile establishment; any common use areas in shopping centers and all parking areas set aside by a merchant or on behalf of a merchant for the parking of vehicles for the convenience of the patrons of such retail mercantile establishment;

(9)"Under-ring" means to cause the cash register or other sale recording device to reflect less than the full retail value of the merchandise;

(10) "Antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure" means any item or device which is designed, manufactured, modified, or altered to defeat any antishoplifting or inventory control device;

(11) "Organized retail theft enterprise" means any association of two or more persons who engage in the conduct of or are associated for the purpose of effectuating the transfer or sale of shoplifted merchandise.

b.Shoplifting. Shoplifting shall consist of any one or more of the following acts:

(1)For any person purposely to take possession of, carry away, transfer or cause to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the full retail value thereof.

(2)For any person purposely to conceal upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the processes, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the value thereof.

(3)For any person purposely to alter, transfer or remove any label, price tag or marking indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining value affixed to any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment and to attempt to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the full retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or some part of the value thereof.

(4)For any person purposely to transfer any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail merchandise establishment from the container in or on which the same shall be displayed to any other container with intent to deprive the merchant of all or some part of the retail value thereof.

(5)For any person purposely to under-ring with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value thereof.

(6)For any person purposely to remove a shopping cart from the premises of a store or other retail mercantile establishment without the consent of the merchant given at the time of such removal with the intention of permanently depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart.

c.Gradation. (1) Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the second degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is $75,000 or more, or the offense is committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise and the full retail value of the merchandise is $1,000 or more.

(2)Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the third degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise exceeds $500 but is less than $75,000, or the offense is committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise and the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $1,000.

(3)Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $200 but does not exceed $500.

(4)Shoplifting is a disorderly persons offense under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $200.

The value of the merchandise involved in a violation of this section may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense where the acts or conduct constituting a violation were committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, or were committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise.

Additionally, notwithstanding the term of imprisonment provided in N.J.S.2C:43-6 or 2C:43-8, any person convicted of a shoplifting offense shall be sentenced to perform community service as follows: for a first offense, at least ten days of community service; for a second offense, at least 15 days of community service; and for a third or subsequent offense, a maximum of 25 days of community service and any person convicted of a third or subsequent shoplifting offense shall serve a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 90 days.

d.Presumptions. Any person purposely concealing unpurchased merchandise of any store or other retail mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store or other retail mercantile establishment, shall be prima facie presumed to have so concealed such merchandise with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the full retail value thereof, and the finding of such merchandise concealed upon the person or among the belongings of such person shall be prima facie evidence of purposeful concealment; and if such person conceals, or causes to be concealed, such merchandise upon the person or among the belongings of another, the finding of the same shall also be prima facie evidence of willful concealment on the part of the person so concealing such merchandise.

e.A law enforcement officer, or a special officer, or a merchant, who has probable cause for believing that a person has willfully concealed unpurchased merchandise and that he can recover the merchandise by taking the person into custody, may, for the purpose of attempting to effect recovery thereof, take the person into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner for not more than a reasonable time, and the taking into custody by a law enforcement officer or special officer or merchant shall not render such person criminally or civilly liable in any manner or to any extent whatsoever.

Any law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant any person he has probable cause for believing has committed the offense of shoplifting as defined in this section.

A merchant who causes the arrest of a person for shoplifting, as provided for in this section, shall not be criminally or civilly liable in any manner or to any extent whatsoever where the merchant has probable cause for believing that the person arrested committed the offense of shoplifting.

f.Any person who possesses or uses any anti-shoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure within any store or other retail mercantile establishment is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.

Amended 1979, c.178, s.35B; 1997, c.319; 2000, c.16, s.1; 2006, c.56, s.1.

2C:21-7. Deceptive business practices - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:21-7 (2013)
Deceptive business practices. A person commits an offense if in the course of business he:

a. Uses or possesses for use a false weight or measure, or any other device for falsely determining or recording any quality or quantity;

b. Sells, offers or exposes for sale, or delivers less than the represented quantity of any commodity or service;

c. Takes or attempts to take more than the represented quantity of any commodity or service when as buyer he furnishes the weight or measure;

d. Sells, offers or exposes for sale adulterated or mislabeled commodities;

e. Makes a false or misleading statement in any advertisement addressed to the public or to a substantial segment thereof for the purpose of promoting the purchase or sale of property or services;

f. Deleted by Amendment (P.L.1981, c. 290).

g. Deleted by Amendment (P.L.1981, c. 290).

h. Makes a false or misleading written statement for the purpose of obtaining property or credit; or

i. Makes a false or misleading written statement for the purpose of promoting the sale of securities, or omits information required by law to be disclosed in written documents relating to securities.

The offense is a crime of the fourth degree if subsection h. or i. is violated. Otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that his conduct was not knowingly or recklessly deceptive.

"Adulterated" means varying from the standard of composition or quality prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing criminal penalties for such variance, or set by established commercial usage. "Mislabeled" means varying from the standard of truth or disclosure in labeling prescribed by or pursuant to any statute providing criminal penalties for such variance, or set by established commercial usage.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:21-7, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 36A, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; L.1981, c. 290, s. 23A, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:21-7.4. Disorderly persons offense - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:21-7.4 (2013)
A person commits a disorderly persons offense if in the course of business he:

a. (1) Falsely represents any food sold, prepared, served or offered for sale to be kosher or kosher for Passover;

(2) Removes or destroys, or causes to be removed or destroyed, the original means of identification affixed to food commodities to indicate that same are kosher or kosher for Passover, except that this paragraph shall not be construed to prevent the removal of the identification if the commodity is offered for sale as non-kosher; or

(3) Sells, disposes of or has in his possession for the purpose of resale as kosher any food commodity to which a slaughterhouse plumba, mark, stamp, tag, brand, label or other means of identification has been fraudulently attached.

b. (1) Labels or identifies a food commodity in package form to be kosher or kosher for Passover or possesses such labels or means of identification, unless he is the manufacturer or packer of the food commodity in package form;

(2) Labels or identifies an article of food not in package form to be kosher or kosher for Passover or possesses such labels or other means of identification, unless he is the manufacturer of the article of food;

(3) Falsely labels any food commodity in package form as kosher or kosher for Passover by having or permitting to be inscribed on it, in any language, the words "kosher" or "kosher for Passover," "parve," "glatt," or any other words or symbols which would tend to deceive or otherwise lead a reasonable individual to believe that the commodity is kosher or kosher for Passover; or

(4) Labels any food commodity in package form by having or permitting to be inscribed on it the words "kosher-style," "kosher-type," "Jewish," or "Jewish-style," unless the product label also displays the word "non-kosher" in letters at least as large and in close proximity.

c. (1) Sells, offers for sale, prepares, or serves in or from the same place of business both unpackaged non-kosher food and unpackaged food he represents to be kosher unless he posts a window sign at the entrance of his establishment which states in block letters at least four inches in height: "Kosher and Non-Kosher Foods Sold Here," or "Kosher and Non-Kosher Foods Served Here," or a statement of similar import; or

(2) Employs any Hebrew word or symbol in any advertising of any food offered for sale or place of business in which food is prepared, whether for on-premises or off-premises consumption, unless the advertisement also sets forth in conjunction therewith and in English, the words "We Sell Kosher Food Only," "We Sell Both Kosher and Non-Kosher Foods," or words of similar import, in letters of at least the same size as the characters used in Hebrew. For the purpose of this paragraph, "Hebrew symbol" means any Hebrew word, or letter, or any symbol, emblem, sign, insignia, or other mark that simulates a Hebrew word or letter.

d. (1) Displays for sale in the same show window or other location on or in his place of business, both unpackaged food represented to be kosher and unpackaged non-kosher food, unless he:

(a) displays over the kosher and non-kosher food signs that read, in clearly visible block letters, "kosher food" and "non-kosher food," respectively, or, as to the display of meat alone, "kosher meat" and "non-kosher meat," respectively;

(b) separates the kosher food products from the non-kosher food products by keeping the products in separate display cabinets, or by segregating kosher items from non-kosher items by use of clearly visible dividers; and

(c) slices or otherwise prepares the kosher food products for sale with utensils used solely for kosher food items;

(2) Prepares or serves any food as kosher whether for consumption in his place of business or elsewhere if in the same place of business he also prepares or serves non-kosher food, unless he:

(a) uses and maintains separate and distinctly labeled or marked dishes and utensils for each type of food; and

(b) includes in clearly visible block letters the statement "Kosher and Non-Kosher Foods Prepared and Sold Here" in each menu or sign used or posted on the premises or distributed or advertised off the premises;

(3) Sells or has in his possession for the purpose of resale as kosher any food commodity not having affixed thereto the original slaughterhouse plumba, mark, stamp, tag, brand, label or other means of identification employed to indicate that the food commodity is kosher or kosher for Passover; or

(4) Sells or offers for sale, as kosher, any fresh meat or poultry that is identified as "soaked and salted," unless (a) the product has in fact been soaked and salted in a manner which makes it kosher; and (b) the product is marked "soaked and salted" on the package label or, if the product is not packaged, on a sign prominently displayed in conjunction with the product. For the purpose of this paragraph, "fresh meat or poultry" shall mean meat and poultry that has not been processed except for salting and soaking.

L. 1988, c. 154, s. 3.

2C:21-9. Misconduct by corporate official - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:21-9 (2013)
A person is guilty of a crime when:

a. Being a director of a corporation, he knowingly with purpose to defraud, concurs in any vote or act of the directors of such corporation, or any of them, which has the purpose of:

(1) Making a dividend except in the manner provided by law;

(2) Dividing, withdrawing or in any manner paying to any stockholder any part of the capital stock of the corporation except in the manner provided by law;

(3) Discounting or receiving any note or other evidence of debt in payment of an installment of capital stock actually called in and required to be paid, or with purpose of providing the means of making such payment;

(4) Receiving or discounting any note or other evidence of debt with purpose of enabling any stockholder to withdraw any part of the money paid in by him on his stock; or

(5) Applying any portion of the funds of such corporation, directly or indirectly, to the purchase of shares of its own stock, except in the manner provided by law; or

b. Being a director or officer of a corporation, he, with purpose to defraud:

(1) Issues, participates in issuing, or concurs in a vote to issue any increase of its capital stock beyond the amount of the capital stock thereof, duly authorized by or in pursuance of law; or

(2) Sells, or agrees to sell, or is directly interested in the sale of any share of stock of such corporation, or in any agreement to sell the same, unless at the time of such sale or agreement he is an actual owner of such share, provided that the foregoing shall not apply to a sale by or on behalf of an underwriter or dealer in connection with a bona fide public offering of shares of stock of such corporation.

c. He purposely or knowingly uses, controls or operates a corporation for the furtherance or promotion of any criminal object.

If the benefit derived from a violation of this section is $75,000.00, or more, the offender is guilty of a crime of the second degree. If the benefit derived exceeds $1,000.00, but is less than $75,000.00, the offender is guilty of a crime of the third degree. If the benefit derived is $1,000.00, or less, the offender is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:21-9, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 37, eff. Sept. 1, 1979; L.1981, c. 290, s. 24, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:21-17 Impersonation; theft of identity; crime. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:21-17 (2013)

2C:21-17. Impersonation; Theft of Identity; crime.

a.A person is guilty of an offense if the person:

(1)Impersonates another or assumes a false identity and does an act in such assumed character or false identity for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for himself or another or to injure or defraud another;

(2)Pretends to be a representative of some person or organization and does an act in such pretended capacity for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for himself or another or to injure or defraud another;

(3)Impersonates another, assumes a false identity or makes a false or misleading statement regarding the identity of any person, in an oral or written application for services, for the purpose of obtaining services;

(4)Obtains any personal identifying information pertaining to another person and uses that information, or assists another person in using the information, in order to assume the identity of or represent himself as another person, without that person's authorization and with the purpose to fraudulently obtain or attempt to obtain a benefit or services, or avoid the payment of debt or other legal obligation or avoid prosecution for a crime by using the name of the other person; or

(5)Impersonates another, assumes a false identity or makes a false or misleading statement, in the course of making an oral or written application for services, with the purpose of avoiding payment for prior services. Purpose to avoid payment for prior services may be presumed upon proof that the person has not made full payment for prior services and has impersonated another, assumed a false identity or made a false or misleading statement regarding the identity of any person in the course of making oral or written application for services.

As used in this section:

"Benefit" means, but is not limited to, any property, any pecuniary amount, any services, any pecuniary amount sought to be avoided or any injury or harm perpetrated on another where there is no pecuniary value.

b.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2005, c.224).

c.A person who violates subsection a. of this section is guilty of a crime as follows:

(1)If the actor obtains a benefit or deprives another of a benefit in an amount less than $500 and the offense involves the identity of one victim, the actor shall be guilty of a crime of the fourth degree except that a second or subsequent conviction for such an offense constitutes a crime of the third degree; or

(2)If the actor obtains a benefit or deprives another of a benefit in an amount of at least $500 but less than $75,000, or the offense involves the identity of at least two but less than five victims, the actor shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree; or

(3)If the actor obtains a benefit or deprives another of a benefit in the amount of $75,000 or more, or the offense involves the identity of five or more victims, the actor shall be guilty of a crime of the second degree.

d.A violation of N.J.S.2C:28-7, constituting a disorderly persons offense, section 1 of P.L.1979, c.264 (C.2C:33-15), R.S.33:1-81 or section 6 of P.L.1968, c.313 (C.33:1-81.7) in a case where the person uses the personal identifying information of another to illegally purchase an alcoholic beverage or for using the personal identifying information of another to misrepresent his age for the purpose of obtaining tobacco or other consumer product denied to persons under 18 years of age shall not constitute an offense under this section if the actor received only that benefit or service and did not perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate any additional injury or fraud on another.

e.The sentencing court shall issue such orders as are necessary to correct any public record or government document that contains false information as a result of a theft of identity. The sentencing court may provide restitution to the victim in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of P.L.2002, c.85 (C.2C:21-17.1).

L.1978, c.95; amended 1995, c.417, s.1; 1999, c.117; 2002, c.85, s.5; 2003, c.184, s.3; 2005, c.224, s.2.

3.A person is guilty of a crime if the person:

a.transports or possesses property known or which a reasonable person would believe to be derived from criminal activity; or

b.engages in a transaction involving property known or which a reasonable person would believe to be derived from criminal activity

(1)with the intent to facilitate or promote the criminal activity; or

(2)knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part:

(a)to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the property derived from criminal activity; or

(b)to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under the laws of this State or any other state or of the United States; or

c.directs, organizes, finances, plans, manages, supervises, or controls the transportation of or transactions in property known or which a reasonable person would believe to be derived from criminal activity.

d.For the purposes of this act, property is known to be derived from criminal activity if the person knows that the property involved represents proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of criminal activity. Among the factors that the finder of fact may consider in determining that a transaction has been designed to avoid a transaction reporting requirement shall be whether the person, acting alone or with others, conducted one or more transactions in currency, in any amount, at one or more financial institutions, on one or more days, in any manner. The phrase "in any manner" includes the breaking down of a single sum of currency exceeding the transaction reporting requirement into smaller sums, including sums at or below the transaction reporting requirement, or the conduct of a transaction, or series of currency transactions, including transactions at or below the transaction reporting requirement. The transaction or transactions need not exceed the transaction reporting threshold at any single financial institution on any single day in order to demonstrate a violation of subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2) of subsection b. of this section.

e.A person is guilty of a crime if, with the purpose to evade a transaction reporting requirement of this State or of 31 U.S.C. s.5311 et seq. or 31 C.F.R. s.103 et seq., or any rules or regulations adopted under those chapters and sections, he:

(1)causes or attempts to cause a financial institution, including a foreign or domestic money transmitter or an authorized delegate thereof, casino, check casher, person engaged in a trade or business or any other individual or entity required by State or federal law to file a report regarding currency transactions or suspicious transactions to fail to file a report; or

(2)causes or attempts to cause a financial institution, including a foreign or domestic money transmitter or an authorized delegate thereof, casino, check casher, person engaged in a trade or business or any other individual or entity required by State or federal law to file a report regarding currency transactions or suspicious transactions to file a report that contains a material omission or misstatement of fact; or

(3)structures or assists in structuring, or attempts to structure or assist in structuring any transaction with one or more financial institutions, including foreign or domestic money transmitters or an authorized delegate thereof, casinos, check cashers, persons engaged in a trade or business or any other individuals or entities required by State or federal law to file a report regarding currency transactions or suspicious transactions. "Structure" or "structuring" means that a person, acting alone, or in conjunction with, or on behalf of, other persons, conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions in currency, in any amount, at one or more financial institutions, on one or more days, in any manner, for the purpose of evading currency transaction reporting requirements provided by State or federal law. "In any manner" includes, but is not limited to, the breaking down into smaller sums of a single sum of currency meeting or exceeding that which is necessary to trigger a currency reporting requirement or the conduct of a transaction, or series of currency transactions, at or below the reporting requirement. The transaction or transactions need not exceed the reporting threshold at any single financial institution on any single day in order to meet the definition of "structure" or "structuring" provided in this paragraph.

L.1994,c.121,s.3; amended 1999, c.25, s.3; 2002, c.26, s.14.

2C:24-4 Endangering welfare of children. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:24-4 (2013)

2C:24-4. Endangering Welfare of Children.

a.Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of a child who engages in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child, or who causes the child harm that would make the child an abused or neglected child as defined in R.S.9:6-1, R.S.9:6-3 and section 1 of P.L.1974, c.119 (C.9:6-8.21) is guilty of a crime of the second degree. Any other person who engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this subsection to a child under the age of 18 is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

b. (1) As used in this subsection:

"Child" means any person under 18 years of age.

"Internet" means the international computer network of both federal and non-federal interoperable packet switched data networks.

"Prohibited sexual act" means

(a)Sexual intercourse; or

(b)Anal intercourse; or

(c)Masturbation; or

(d)Bestiality; or

(e)Sadism; or

(f)Masochism; or

(g)Fellatio; or

(h)Cunnilingus; or

(i)Nudity, if depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who may view such depiction; or

(j)Any act of sexual penetration or sexual contact as defined in N.J.S.2C:14-1.

"Reproduction" means, but is not limited to, computer generated images.

(2)(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.291).

(3)A person commits a crime of the second degree if he causes or permits a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act if the person knows, has reason to know or intends that the prohibited act may be photographed, filmed, reproduced, or reconstructed in any manner, including on the Internet, or may be part of an exhibition or performance. If the person is a parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the care or custody of the child, the person shall be guilty of a crime of the first degree.

(4)Any person who photographs or films a child in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act or who uses any device, including a computer, to reproduce or reconstruct the image of a child in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act is guilty of a crime of the second degree.

(5) (a) Any person who knowingly receives for the purpose of selling or who knowingly sells, procures, manufactures, gives, provides, lends, trades, mails, delivers, transfers, publishes, distributes, circulates, disseminates, presents, exhibits, advertises, offers or agrees to offer, through any means, including the Internet, any photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file, video game or any other reproduction or reconstruction which depicts a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act, is guilty of a crime of the second degree.

(b)Any person who knowingly possesses or knowingly views any photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file, video game or any other reproduction or reconstruction which depicts a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act, including on the Internet, is guilty of a crime of the third degree.

(6)For purposes of this subsection, a person who is depicted as or presents the appearance of being under the age of 18 in any photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file, video game or any other reproduction or reconstruction shall be rebuttably presumed to be under the age of 18. If the child who is depicted as engaging in, or who is caused to engage in, a prohibited sexual act or simulation of a prohibited sexual act is under the age of 18, the actor shall be strictly liable and it shall not be a defense that the actor did not know that the child was under the age of 18, nor shall it be a defense that the actor believed that the child was 18 years of age or older, even if such a mistaken belief was reasonable.

amended 1979, c.178, s.46; 1983, c.494; 1992, c.2; 1992, c.6; 1995, c.109; 1998, c.126; 2001, c.291; 2013, c.51, s.13.

2C:25-22. Immunity from civil liability - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:25-22 (2013)
6. A law enforcement officer or a member of a domestic crisis team or any person who, in good faith, reports a possible incident of domestic violence to the police shall not be held liable in any civil action brought by any party for an arrest based on probable cause, enforcement in good faith of a court order, or any other act or omission in good faith under this act.

L.1991,c.261,s.6; amended 1994,c.94,s.2. 

2C:25-23. Dissemination of notice to victim of domestic violence - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:25-23 (2013)
7. A law enforcement officer shall disseminate and explain to the victim the following notice, which shall be written in both English and Spanish:

"You have the right to go to court to get an order called a temporary restraining order, also called a TRO, which may protect you from more abuse by your attacker. The officer who handed you this card can tell you how to get a TRO.

The kinds of things a judge can order in a TRO may include:



(1) That your attacker is temporarily forbidden from entering the home you live in;

(2) That your attacker is temporarily forbidden from having contact with you or your relatives;

(3) That your attacker is temporarily forbidden from bothering you at work;

(4) That your attacker has to pay temporary child support or support for you;

(5) That you be given temporary custody of your children;

(6) That your attacker pay you back any money you have to spend for medical treatment or repairs because of the violence. There are other things the court can order, and the court clerk will explain the procedure to you and will help you fill out the papers for a TRO.

You also have the right to file a criminal complaint against your attacker. The police officer who gave you this paper will tell you how to file a criminal complaint.

On weekends, holidays and other times when the courts are closed, you still have a right to get a TRO. The police officer who gave you this paper can help you get in touch with a judge who can give you a TRO."

L.1991,c.261,s.7.

2C:27-2. Bribery in official and political matters - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:27-2 (2013)
A person is guilty of bribery if he directly or indirectly offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another:

a. Any benefit as consideration for a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion of a public servant, party official or voter on any public issue or in any public election; or

b. Any benefit as consideration for a decision, vote, recommendation or exercise of official discretion in a judicial or administrative proceeding; or

c. Any benefit as consideration for a violation of an official duty of a public servant or party official; or

d. Any benefit as consideration for the performance of official duties.

For the purposes of this section "benefit as consideration" shall be deemed to mean any benefit not authorized by law.

It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a person whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason.

In any prosecution under this section of an actor who offered, conferred or agreed to confer, or who solicited, accepted or agreed to accept a benefit, it is no defense that he did so as a result of conduct by another constituting theft by extortion or coercion or an attempt to commit either of those crimes.

Any offense proscribed by this section is a crime of the second degree. If the benefit offered, conferred, agreed to be conferred, solicited, accepted or agreed to be accepted is of the value of $200.00 or less, any offense proscribed by this section is a crime of the third degree.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:27-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1979, c. 178, s. 48, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:29-1. Obstructing administration of law or other governmental function - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:29-1 (2013)
2C:29-1. Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function. a. A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act. This section does not apply to failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.

b.An offense under this section is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor obstructs the detection or investigation of a crime or the prosecution of a person for a crime, otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1986, c.34, 2000, c.18, s.1.

2C:29-2. Resisting arrest, eluding officer
2C:29-2. Resisting Arrest; Eluding Officer. a. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if he purposely prevents or attempts to prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting an arrest. (2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if he, by flight, purposely prevents or attempts to prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting an arrest. (3) An offense under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. is a crime of the third degree if the person:

(a)Uses or threatens to use physical force or violence against the law enforcement officer or another; or

(b)Uses any other means to create a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the public servant or another.

It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the law enforcement officer was acting unlawfully in making the arrest, provided he was acting under color of his official authority and provided the law enforcement officer announces his intention to arrest prior to the resistance.

b.Any person, while operating a motor vehicle on any street or highway in this State or any vessel, as defined pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1995, c.401 (C.12:7-71), on the waters of this State, who knowingly flees or attempts to elude any police or law enforcement officer after having received any signal from such officer to bring the vehicle or vessel to a full stop commits a crime of the third degree; except that, a person is guilty of a crime of the second degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person. For purposes of this subsection, there shall be a permissive inference that the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person if the person's conduct involves a violation of chapter 4 of Title 39 or chapter 7 of Title 12 of the Revised Statutes. In addition to the penalty prescribed under this subsection or any other section of law, the court shall order the suspension of that person's driver's license, or privilege to operate a vessel, whichever is appropriate, for a period of not less than six months or more than two years.

In the case of a person who is at the time of the imposition of sentence less than 17 years of age, the period of the suspension of driving privileges authorized herein, including a suspension of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period as fixed by the court. If the driving or vessel operating privilege of any person is under revocation, suspension, or postponement for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 39 of the Revised Statutes at the time of any conviction or adjudication of delinquency for a violation of any offense defined in this chapter or chapter 36 of this Title, the revocation, suspension, or postponement period imposed herein shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation, suspension, or postponement.

Upon conviction the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's licenses of the person and forward such license or licenses to the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles along with a report indicating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If the court is for any reason unable to collect the license or licenses of the person, the court shall cause a report of the conviction or adjudication of delinquency to be filed with the director. That report shall include the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person and shall indicate the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle or a vessel, whichever is appropriate, during the period of license suspension or postponement imposed pursuant to this section the person shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S.39:3-40 or section 14 of P.L.1995, c.401 (C.12:7-83), whichever is appropriate. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of violation of R.S.39:3-40 or section 14 of P.L.1995, c.401 (C.12:7-83), whichever is appropriate. If the person is the holder of a driver's or vessel operator's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify the director who shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, in accordance with the provisions of this section, revoke the person's non-resident driving or vessel operating privileges, whichever is appropriate, in this State.

For the purposes of this subsection, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the owner of a vehicle or vessel was the operator of the vehicle or vessel at the time of the offense.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1979, c.178, s.57; 1981, c.290, s.28; 1989, c.84; 1991, c.341, s.3; 1993, c.219, s.5; 1995, c.401, s.54; 2000, c.18, s.2.

2C:29-3 Hindering apprehension or prosecution. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:29-3 (2013)

2C:29-3. Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution. a. A person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder the detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for an offense or violation of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes or a violation of chapter 33A of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes he:

(1)Harbors or conceals the other;

(2)Provides or aids in providing a weapon, money, transportation, disguise or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension or effecting escape;

(3)Suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of the crime, or tampers with a witness, informant, document or other source of information, regardless of its admissibility in evidence, which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him;

(4)Warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension, except that this paragraph does not apply to a warning given in connection with an effort to bring another into compliance with law;

(5)Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a charge against him;

(6)Aids such person to protect or expeditiously profit from an advantage derived from such crime; or

(7)Gives false information to a law enforcement officer or a civil State investigator assigned to the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor established by section 32 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:33A-16).

An offense under paragraph (5) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the second degree, unless the actor is a spouse, domestic partner, partner in a civil union, parent or child to the person aided who is the victim of the offense, in which case the offense is a crime of the fourth degree. Otherwise, the offense is a crime of the third degree if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against the person aided would constitute a crime of the second degree or greater, unless the actor is a spouse, domestic partner, partner in a civil union, parent or child of the person aided, in which case the offense is a crime of the fourth degree. The offense is a crime of the fourth degree if such conduct would constitute a crime of the third degree. Otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.

b.A person commits an offense if, with purpose to hinder his own detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction or punishment for an offense or violation of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes or a violation of chapter 33A of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes, he:

(1)Suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of the crime or tampers with a document or other source of information, regardless of its admissibility in evidence, which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or

(2)Prevents or obstructs by means of force or intimidation anyone from performing an act which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or

(3)Prevents or obstructs by means of force, intimidation or deception any witness or informant from providing testimony or information, regardless of its admissibility, which might aid in his discovery or apprehension or in the lodging of a charge against him; or

(4)Gives false information to a law enforcement officer or a civil State investigator assigned to the Office of the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor established by section 32 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.17:33A-16).

An offense under paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the second degree. Otherwise, the offense is a crime of the third degree if the conduct which the actor knows has been charged or is liable to be charged against him would constitute a crime of the second degree or greater. The offense is a crime of the fourth degree if such conduct would constitute a crime of the third degree. Otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.

Amended 1981, c.290, s.29; amended 1999, c.297; 2008, c.81, s.2.

2C:33-2. Disorderly conduct - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-2 (2013)

a. Improper behavior. A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he

(1) Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or

(2) Creates a hazardous or physically dangerous condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.

b. Offensive language. A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present.

"Public" means affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, or any neighborhood.

L.1978, c. 95, s. 2C:33-2, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:33-4. Harassment.

Except as provided in subsection e., a person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass another, he:

a.Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

b.Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

c.Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

A communication under subsection a. may be deemed to have been made either at the place where it originated or at the place where it was received.

d.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).

e.A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, in committing an offense under this section, he was serving a term of imprisonment or was on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States.

L.1978, c.95; amended 1983, c.334; 1990, c.87, s.2; 1995, c.211, s.2; 1998, c.17, s.4; 2001, c.443, s.3.

2C:33-15 Possession, consumption of alcoholic beverages by persons under legal age; penalty. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-15 (2013)

1. a. Any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who knowingly possesses without legal authority or who knowingly consumes any alcoholic beverage in any school, public conveyance, public place, or place of public assembly, or motor vehicle, is guilty of a disorderly persons offense, and shall be fined not less than $500.00.

b.Whenever this offense is committed in a motor vehicle, the court shall, in addition to the sentence authorized for the offense, suspend or postpone for six months the driving privilege of the defendant. Upon the conviction of any person under this section, the court shall forward a report to the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission stating the first and last day of the suspension or postponement period imposed by the court pursuant to this section. If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence is less than 17 years of age, the period of license postponement, including a suspension or postponement of the privilege of operating a motorized bicycle, shall commence on the day the sentence is imposed and shall run for a period of six months after the person reaches the age of 17 years.

If a person at the time of the imposition of a sentence has a valid driver's license issued by this State, the court shall immediately collect the license and forward it to the commission along with the report. If for any reason the license cannot be collected, the court shall include in the report the complete name, address, date of birth, eye color, and sex of the person as well as the first and last date of the license suspension period imposed by the court.

The court shall inform the person orally and in writing that if the person is convicted of operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension or postponement, the person shall be subject to the penalties set forth in R.S.39:3-40. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of the written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S.39:3-40.

If the person convicted under this section is not a New Jersey resident, the court shall suspend or postpone, as appropriate, the non-resident driving privilege of the person based on the age of the person and submit to the commission the required report. The court shall not collect the license of a non-resident convicted under this section. Upon receipt of a report by the court, the commission shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction of the suspension or postponement.

c.In addition to the general penalty prescribed for a disorderly persons offense, the court may require any person who violates this act to participate in an alcohol education or treatment program, authorized by the Department of Health and Senior Services, for a period not to exceed the maximum period of confinement prescribed by law for the offense for which the individual has been convicted.

d.Nothing in this act shall apply to possession of alcoholic beverages by any such person while actually engaged in the performance of employment pursuant to an employment permit issued by the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, or for a bona fide hotel or restaurant, in accordance with the provisions of R.S.33:1-26, or while actively engaged in the preparation of food while enrolled in a culinary arts or hotel management program at a county vocational school or post secondary educational institution.

e.The provisions of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.169 (C.33:1-81.1a) shall apply to a parent, guardian or other person with legal custody of a person under 18 years of age who is found to be in violation of this section.

f.An underage person and one or two other persons shall be immune from prosecution under this section if:

(1)one of the underage persons called 9-1-1 and reported that another underage person was in need of medical assistance due to alcohol consumption;

(2)the underage person who called 9-1-1 and, if applicable, one or two other persons acting in concert with the underage person who called 9-1-1 provided each of their names to the 9-1-1 operator;

(3)the underage person was the first person to make the 9-1-1 report; and

(4)the underage person and, if applicable, one or two other persons acting in concert with the underage person who made the 9-1-1 call remained on the scene with the person under the legal age in need of medical assistance until assistance arrived and cooperated with medical assistance and law enforcement personnel on the scene.

The underage person who received medical assistance also shall be immune from prosecution under this section.

L.1979, c.264, s.1; amended 1991, c.169, s.2; 1997, c.161; 2009, c.133, s.1.

2C:33-17. Availability of alcoholic beverages to underaged, offenses - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-17 (2013)
1. a. Anyone who purposely or knowingly offers or serves or makes available an alcoholic beverage to a person under the legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages or entices or encourages that person to drink an alcoholic beverage is a disorderly person.

This subsection shall not apply to a parent or guardian of the person under legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages if the parent or guardian is of the legal age to consume alcoholic beverages or to a religious observance, ceremony or rite. This subsection shall also not apply to any person in his home who is of the legal age to consume alcoholic beverages who offers or serves or makes available an alcoholic beverage to a person under the legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages or entices that person to drink an alcoholic beverage in the presence of and with the permission of the parent or guardian of the person under the legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages if the parent or guardian is of the legal age to consume alcoholic beverages.

b. A person who makes real property owned, leased or managed by him available to, or leaves that property in the care of, another person with the purpose that alcoholic beverages will be made available for consumption by, or will be consumed by, persons who are under the legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.

This subsection shall not apply if:

(1) the real property is licensed or required to be licensed by the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control in accordance with the provisions of R.S.33:1-1 et seq;

(2) the person making the property available, or leaving it in the care of another person, is of the legal age to consume alcoholic beverages and is the parent or guardian of the person who consumes alcoholic beverages while under the legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages; or

(3) the alcoholic beverages are consumed by a person under the legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages during a religious observance, ceremony or rite.

L.1985,c.311,s.1; amended 1995,c.31. 

2C:35-5. Manufacturing, distributing or dispensing - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:35-5 (2013)
2C:35-5. Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing. a. Except as authorized by P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-1 et seq.), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or purposely:

(1) To manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under his control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog; or

(2) To create, distribute, or possess or have under his control with intent to distribute, a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance.

b.Any person who violates subsection a. with respect to:

(1) Heroin, or its analog, or coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, or analogs, except that the substances shall not include decocainized coca leaves or extractions which do not contain cocaine or ecogine, or 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine or 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine, in a quantity of five ounces or more including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the first degree. The defendant shall, except as provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term which shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $500,000.00 may be imposed;

(2) A substance referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection, in a quantity of one-half ounce or more but less than five ounces, including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

(3) A substance referred to paragraph (1) of this subsection in a quantity less than one-half ounce including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the third degree except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $75,000.00 may be imposed;

(4) A substance classified as a narcotic drug in Schedule I or II other than those specifically covered in this section, or the analog of any such substance, in a quantity of one ounce or more including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

(5) A substance classified as a narcotic drug in Schedule I or II other than those specifically covered in this section, or the analog of any such substance, in a quantity of less than one ounce including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the third degree except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $75,000.00 may be imposed;

(6) Lysergic acid diethylamide, or its analog, in a quantity of 100 milligrams or more including any adulterants or dilutants, or phencyclidine, or its analog, in a quantity of 10 grams or more including any adulterants or dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the first degree. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, the court shall impose a term of imprisonment which shall include the imposition of a minimum term, fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $500,000.00 may be imposed;

(7) Lysergic acid diethylamide, or its analog, in a quantity of less than 100 milligrams including any adulterants or dilutants, or where the amount is undetermined, or phencyclidine, or its analog, in a quantity of less than 10 grams including any adulterants or dilutants, or where the amount is undetermined, is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

(8) Methamphetamine, or its analog, or phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), in a quantity of five ounces or more including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the first degree. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $300,000.00 may be imposed;

(9) (a) Methamphetamine, or its analog, or phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), in a quantity of one-half ounce or more but less than five ounces including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

(b) Methamphetamine, or its analog, or phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), in a quantity of less than one-half ounce including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the third degree except that notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $75,000.00 may be imposed;

(10) (a) Marijuana in a quantity of 25 pounds or more including any adulterants or dilutants, or 50 or more marijuana plants, regardless of weight, or hashish in a quantity of five pounds or more including any adulterants or dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the first degree. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $300,000.00 may be imposed;

(b) Marijuana in a quantity of five pounds or more but less than 25 pounds including any adulterants or dilutants, or 10 or more but fewer than 50 marijuana plants, regardless of weight, or hashish in a quantity of one pound or more but less than five pounds, including any adulterants and dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

(11) Marijuana in a quantity of one ounce or more but less than five pounds including any adulterants or dilutants, or hashish in a quantity of five grams or more but less than one pound including any adulterants or dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the third degree except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $25,000.00 may be imposed;

(12) Marijuana in a quantity of less than one ounce including any adulterants or dilutants, or hashish in a quantity of less than five grams including any adulterants or dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree;

(13) Any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I, II, III or IV, or its analog, is guilty of a crime of the third degree, except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $25,000.00 may be imposed; or

(14) Any Schedule V substance, or its analog, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $25,000.00 may be imposed.

c.Where the degree of the offense for violation of this section depends on the quantity of the substance, the quantity involved shall be determined by the trier of fact. Where the indictment or accusation so provides, the quantity involved in individual acts of manufacturing, distribution, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense, whether distribution or dispensing is to the same person or several persons, provided that each individual act of manufacturing, distribution, dispensing or possession with intent to distribute was committed within the applicable statute of limitations.

L.1987, c.106, s.1; amended 1988, c.44, s.2; 1997, c.181, s.3; 1997, c.186, s.3; 2000, c.55; 2000, c.136.

2C:35-7 Distribution on or within 1,000 feet of school property. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:35-7 (2013)

1. a. Any person who violates subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:35-5 by distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property or a school bus, or while on any school bus, is guilty of a crime of the third degree and shall, except as provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment. Where the violation involves less than one ounce of marijuana, the term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term which shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or one year, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. In all other cases, the term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term which shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $150,000 may also be imposed upon any conviction for a violation of this section.

b. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:35-12 or subsection a. of this section, the court may waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility required under subsection a. of this section or place the defendant on probation pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-2. In making this determination, the court shall consider:

(a)the extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses for which the defendant has been convicted;

(b)the specific location of the present offense in relation to the school property, including distance from the school and the reasonable likelihood of exposing children to drug-related activities at that location;

(c)whether school was in session at the time of the offense; and

(d)whether children were present at or in the immediate vicinity of the location when the offense took place.

(2)The court shall not waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility or sentence the defendant to probation if it finds that:

(a)the offense took place while on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or while on any school bus; or

(b)the defendant in the course of committing the offense used or threatened violence or was in possession of a firearm.

If the court at sentencing elects not to impose a minimum term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility pursuant to this subsection, imposes a term of parole ineligibility less than the minimum term prescribed in subsection a. of this section, or places the defendant on probation for a violation of subsection a. of this section, the sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to permit the prosecution to appeal the court's finding and the sentence imposed. The Attorney General shall develop guidelines to ensure the uniform exercise of discretion in making determinations regarding whether to appeal a decision to waive or reduce the minimum term of parole ineligibility or place the defendant on probation.

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to establish a basis for overcoming a presumption of imprisonment authorized or required by subsection d. of N.J.S.2C:44-1, or a basis for not imposing a term of imprisonment or term of parole ineligibility authorized or required to be imposed pursuant to subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:43-6 or upon conviction for a crime other than the offense set forth in this subsection.

c.Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for a violation of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:35-5 (manufacturing, distributing or dispensing) or N.J.S.2C:35-6 (employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme).

d.It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of this section that the actor was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under this section, or under any other provision of this title, that no juveniles were present on the school property at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

e.It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of this section that the prohibited conduct took place entirely within a private residence, that no person 17 years of age or younger was present in such private residence at any time during the commission of the offense, and that the prohibited conduct did not involve distributing, dispensing or possessing with the intent to distribute or dispense any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog for profit. The affirmative defense established in this section shall be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Nothing herein shall be construed to establish an affirmative defense with respect to a prosecution for an offense defined in any other section of this chapter.

f.In a prosecution under this section, a map produced or reproduced by any municipal or county engineer for the purpose of depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or a true copy of such a map, shall, upon proper authentication, be admissible and shall constitute prima facie evidence of the location and boundaries of those areas, provided that the governing body of the municipality or county has adopted a resolution or ordinance approving the map as official finding and record of the location and boundaries of the area or areas on or within 1,000 feet of the school property. Any map approved pursuant to this section may be changed from time to time by the governing body of the municipality or county. The original of every map approved or revised pursuant to this section, or a true copy thereof, shall be filed with the clerk of the municipality or county, and shall be maintained as an official record of the municipality or county. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude the prosecution from introducing or relying upon any other evidence or testimony to establish any element of this offense; nor shall this section be construed to preclude the use or admissibility of any map or diagram other than one which has been approved by the governing body of a municipality or county, provided that the map or diagram is otherwise admissible pursuant to the Rules of Evidence.


L.1987, c.101, s.1; amended 1988, c.44, s.3; 1997, c.181, s.5; 2009, c.192, s.1.

7. a. A person who, in good faith, seeks medical assistance for someone experiencing a drug overdose shall not be:

(1)arrested, charged, prosecuted, or convicted for obtaining, possessing, using, being under the influence of, or failing to make lawful disposition of, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog pursuant to subsection a., b., or c. of N.J.S.2C:35-10;

(2)arrested, charged, prosecuted, or convicted for inhaling the fumes of or possessing any toxic chemical pursuant to subsection b. of section 7 of P.L.1999, c.90 (C.2C:35-10.4);

(3)arrested, charged, prosecuted, or convicted for using, obtaining, attempting to obtain, or possessing any prescription legend drug or stramonium preparation pursuant to subsection b., d., or e. of section 8 of P.L.1999, c.90 (C.2C:35-10.5);

(4)arrested, charged, prosecuted, or convicted for acquiring or obtaining possession of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog by fraud pursuant to N.J.S.2C:35-13;

(5)arrested, charged, prosecuted, or convicted for unlawfully possessing a controlled dangerous substance that was lawfully prescribed or dispensed pursuant to P.L.1998, c.90 (C.2C:35-24);

(6)arrested, charged, prosecuted, or convicted for using or possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia pursuant to N.J.S.2C:36-2 or for having under his control or possessing a hypodermic syringe, hypodermic needle, or any other instrument adapted for the use of a controlled dangerous substance or a controlled substance analog pursuant to subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:36-6;

(7)subject to revocation of parole or probation based only upon a violation of offenses described in subsection a. (1) through (6) of this section, provided, however, this circumstance may be considered in establishing or modifying the conditions of parole or probation supervision.

b.The provisions of subsection a. of this section shall only apply if:

(1)the person seeks medical assistance for another person who is experiencing a drug overdose and is in need of medical assistance; and

(2)the evidence for an arrest, charge, prosecution, conviction, or revocation was obtained as a result of the seeking of medical assistance.

c.Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the admissibility of any evidence in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a crime with regard to a defendant who does not qualify for the protections of this act or with regard to other crimes committed by a person who otherwise qualifies for protection pursuant to this act. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit any seizure of evidence or contraband otherwise permitted by law. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit or abridge the authority of a law enforcement officer to detain or take into custody a person in the course of an investigation or to effectuate an arrest for any offense except as provided in subsection a. of this section. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit, modify or remove any immunity from liability currently available to public entities or public employees by law.

L.2013, c.46, s.7.

2C:36-2 Use or possession with intent to use, disorderly persons offense.
2C:36-2. Use or possession with intent to use, disorderly persons offense.

It shall be unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled dangerous substance, controlled substance analog or toxic chemical in violation of the provisions of chapter 35 of this title. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.

Amended 2007, c.31, s.3.

2C:36-3 Distribute, dispense or possess with intent to distribute or manufacture, crime of fourth degree.
2C:36-3. Distribute, dispense or possess with intent to distribute or manufacture, crime of fourth degree. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:36-3 (2013)

It shall be unlawful for any person to distribute or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, or manufacture with intent to distribute or dispense, drug paraphernalia, knowing that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled dangerous substance, controlled substance analog or toxic chemical in violation of the provisions of chapter 35 of this title. Any person who violates this section commits a crime of the fourth degree.

Amended 2007, c.31, s.4.

2C:36-6. Possession or distribution of hypodermic syringe or needle - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:36-6 (2013)

2C:36-6. a. Except as authorized by subsection b., c. or other law, it shall be unlawful for a person to have under his control or possess with intent to use a hypodermic syringe, hypodermic needle or any other instrument adapted for the use of a controlled dangerous substance or a controlled substance analog as defined in chapter 35 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes or to sell, furnish or give to any person such syringe, needle or instrument. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.

b.A person is authorized to possess and use a hypodermic needle or hypodermic syringe if the person obtains the hypodermic syringe or hypodermic needle by a valid prescription issued by a licensed physician, dentist or veterinarian and uses it for its authorized purpose.

No prescription for a hypodermic syringe, hypodermic needle or any other instrument adapted for the use of controlled dangerous substances by subcutaneous injections shall be valid for more than one year from the date of issuance.

c.Subsection a. does not apply to a duly licensed physician, dentist, veterinarian, undertaker, nurse, podiatrist, registered pharmacist, or a hospital, sanitarium, clinical laboratory or any other medical institution, or a state or a governmental agency, or a regular dealer in medical, dental or surgical supplies, or a resident physician or intern of a hospital, sanitarium or other medical institution.

L.1987, c.106, s.2; amended 1999,c.90, s.2.

2C:40-3. Hazing; aggravated hazing - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:40-3 (2013)
a. A person is guilty of hazing, a disorderly persons offense, if, in connection with initiation of applicants to or members of a student or fraternal organization, he knowingly or recklessly organizes, promotes, facilitates or engages in any conduct, other than competitive athletic events, which places or may place another person in danger of bodily injury.

b. A person is guilty of aggravated hazing, a crime of the fourth degree, if he commits an act prohibited in subsection a. which results in serious bodily injury to another person.

L.1980, c. 169, s. 1, eff. Dec. 18, 1980.

1. a. It shall be a crime of the fourth degree to operate a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension in violation of R.S.39:3-40, if the actor's license was suspended or revoked for a first violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and the actor had previously been convicted of violating R.S.39:3-40 while under suspension for that first offense. A person convicted of an offense under this subsection shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment.

b.It shall be a crime of the fourth degree to operate a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension in violation of R.S.39:3-40, if the actor's license was suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a). A person convicted of an offense under this subsection shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment.

c.Notwithstanding the term of imprisonment provided under N.J.S.2C:43-6 and the provisions of subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1, if a person is convicted of a crime under this section the sentence imposed shall include a fixed minimum sentence of not less than 180 days during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.

L.2009, c.333, s.1.

2C:40A-2. Violation of contract to pay employees - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:40A-2 (2013)
10. Violation of contract to pay employees.

a.An employer who has agreed with an employee or with a bargaining agent for employees to pay wages, compensation or benefits to or for the benefit of employees commits a disorderly persons offense if the employer:

(1) fails to pay wages when due; or

(2) fails to pay compensation or benefits within 30 days after due.

b.If a corporate employer violates subsection a., any officer or employee of the corporation who is responsible for the violation commits a disorderly persons offense.

L.1999,c.90, s.10.

2C:40A-3. Wrongful discharge of employee - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:40A-3 (2013)
11. Wrongful discharge of employee.

a.An employer who discharges an employee or takes any other disciplinary action against the employee because the employee's earnings have been subjected to garnishment commits a disorderly persons offense.

b.An employer who discharges an employee or takes any other disciplinary action in violation of this section shall re-employ any employee discharged, and shall compensate any employee for any damages resulting from the discharge or disciplinary action.

c.The term "earnings" means any form of compensation payable for personal services, regardless of whether the payment is denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, income from trust funds, profits, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.

L.1999,c.90, s.11.

2C:43-5.1 Crimes committed by students, notification to principal, certain circumstances. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:43-5.1 (2013)

1.At the time of a criminal charge, adjudication of delinquency, or conviction of any student who is 18 years of age or older and is enrolled in secondary school, the law enforcement or prosecuting agency shall provide written notice to the school principal of the identity of that student, the offense charged, the adjudication, and the conviction if:

a.The offense occurred on school property or a school bus, occurred at a school-sponsored function or was committed against an employee or official of the school;

b.The student was taken into custody as a result of information or evidence provided by school officials; or

c.The offense constitutes a crime, and the offense:

(1)resulted in death or serious bodily injury or involved an attempt or conspiracy to cause death or serious bodily injury;

(2)involved the unlawful use or possession of a firearm or other weapon;

(3)involved the unlawful manufacture, distribution or possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog;

(4)was committed with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity; or

(5)is a crime of the first, second, or third degree.

Information provided to the principal pursuant to this subsection shall be maintained by the school and shall be treated as confidential but may be made available to such members of the staff and faculty of the school as the principal deems appropriate for maintaining order, safety or discipline in the school or for planning programs relevant to a student's educational and social development.

L.2009, c.157, s.1.

2C:47-5. Parole - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:47-5 (2013)
2C:47-5. Parole

a.Any offender committed to confinement under the terms of this chapter shall become eligible for parole consideration upon referral to the State Parole Board of the offender's case by a special classification review board appointed by the commissioner. The referral shall be based on the determination by the special classification review board that the offender has achieved a satisfactory level of progress in sex offender treatment. The offender shall be released on parole unless the State Parole Board determines that the information supplied in the report filed pursuant to section 10 of P.L.1979, c.441 (C. 30:4-123.54) or developed or produced at a hearing held pursuant to section 11 of P.L.1979, c.441 (C.30:4-123.55) indicates by a preponderance of the evidence that the offender has failed to cooperate in his or her own rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable expectation that the offender will violate conditions of parole imposed pursuant to section 15 of P.L.1979, c.441 (C.30:4-123.59) if released on parole at that time.

b.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.1998, c.73.)

c.Any offender paroled pursuant to this section shall be subject to the provisions of Title 30 of the Revised Statutes governing parole and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.

d.When an offender confined under the terms of this chapter has not been paroled in accordance with subsection a. of this section and is scheduled for release, not less than 90 days prior to the date of the offender's scheduled release the Chief Executive Officer shall:

(1)Notify the Attorney General and the prosecutor of the county from which the offender was committed of the scheduled release;

(2)Provide the Attorney General and the county prosecutor with the officer's opinion as to whether the offender may be "in need of involuntary commitment" within the meaning of section 2 of P.L. 1987, c. 116 (C. 30:4-27.2) and as to whether the person may be a "sexually violent predator" within the meaning of section 3 of P.L.1998, c.71 (C.30:4-27.26); and

(3) Without regard to classification as confidential pursuant to regulations of the State Parole Board or the Department of Corrections, provide the Attorney General and county prosecutor with all reports, records and assessments relevant to determining whether the offender is "in need of involuntary commitment" and whether the person is a "sexually violent predator." All information received shall be deemed confidential and shall be disclosed only as provided in section 4 of P.L.1994, c.134 (C.30:4-82.4).

e.Upon receipt of the notice, advice and information required by subsection d. of this section, the Attorney General or county prosecutor shall proceed as provided in section 4 of P.L.1994,c.134 (C.30:4-82.4) or section 5 of P.L.1998, c.71 (C.30:4-27.28), as appropriate.

f.(Deleted by amendment, P.L.1998, c.71).

L.1978, c.95; amended 1994, c.134, s.3; 1997, c.60, s.2; 1998, c.71, s.16; 1998, c.73, s.1.

2C:51-2 Forfeiture of public office, position, or employment. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:51-2 (2013)

2C:51-2. Forfeiture of Public Office, Position, or Employment.

a.A person holding any public office, position, or employment, elective or appointive, under the government of this State or any agency or political subdivision thereof, who is convicted of an offense shall forfeit such office, position or employment if:

(1)He is convicted under the laws of this State of an offense involving dishonesty or of a crime of the third degree or above or under the laws of another state or of the United States of an offense or a crime which, if committed in this State, would be such an offense or crime;

(2)He is convicted of an offense involving or touching such office, position or employment; or

(3)The Constitution so provides.

As used in this subsection, "involving or touching such office, position or employment" means that the offense was related directly to the person's performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the specific public office, position or employment held by the person.

b.A court of this State shall enter an order of forfeiture pursuant to subsection a.:

(1)Immediately upon a finding of guilt by the trier of fact or a plea of guilty entered in any court of this State unless the court, for good cause shown, orders a stay of such forfeiture pending a hearing on the merits at the time of sentencing; or

(2)Upon application of the county prosecutor or the Attorney General, when the forfeiture is based upon a conviction of an offense under the laws of another state or of the United States. An order of forfeiture pursuant to this paragraph shall be deemed to have taken effect on the date the person was found guilty by the trier of fact or pled guilty to the offense.

c.No court shall grant a stay of an order of forfeiture pending appeal of a conviction or forfeiture order unless the court is clearly convinced that there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. If the conviction be reversed or the order of forfeiture be overturned, he shall be restored, if feasible, to his office, position or employment with all the rights, emoluments and salary thereof from the date of forfeiture.

Any official action taken by the convicted person on or after the date as of which a forfeiture of the person's office shall take effect shall, during a period of 60 days following the date on which an order of forfeiture shall have been issued hereunder, be voidable by the person's successor in office or, if the office of the person was that of member of the governing body of a county, municipality or independent authority, by that governing body.

d.In addition to the punishment prescribed for the offense, and the forfeiture set forth in subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:51-2, any person convicted of an offense involving or touching on his public office, position or employment shall be forever disqualified from holding any office or position of honor, trust or profit under this State or any of its administrative or political subdivisions. As used in this subsection, "involving or touching on his public office, position or employment" means that the offense was related directly to the person's performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the specific public office, position or employment held by the person.

e.Any forfeiture or disqualification under subsection a., b. or d. which is based upon a conviction of a disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense may be waived by the court upon application of the county prosecutor or the Attorney General and for good cause shown.

f.Except as may otherwise be ordered by the Attorney General as the public need may require, any person convicted of an offense under section 97 of P.L.1999, c.440 (C.2C:21-34), N.J.S.2C:27-2, N.J.S.2C:27-3, N.J.S.2C:27-5, section 100 of P.L.1999, c. 440 (C.2C:27-9), section 5 of P.L.2003, c.255 (C.2C:27-10), section 6 of P.L.2003, c.255 (C.2C:27-11), N.J.S.2C:29-4, N.J.S.2C:30-2, or N.J.S.2C:30-3 of this Title shall be ineligible, either directly or indirectly, to submit a bid, enter into any contract, or to conduct any business with any board, agency, authority, department, commission, public corporation, or other body of this State, of this or one or more other states, or of one or more political subdivisions of this State for a period of, but not more than, 10 years from the date of conviction for a crime of the second degree, or five years from the date of conviction for a crime of the third degree. It is the purpose of this subsection to bar any individual convicted of any of the above enumerated offenses and any business, including any corporation, partnership, association or proprietorship in which such individual is a principal, or with respect to which such individual owns, directly or indirectly, or controls 5% or more of the stock or other equity interest of such business, from conducting business with public entities.

The State Treasurer shall keep and maintain a list of all corporations barred from conducting such business pursuant to this section.

g.In any case in which the issue of forfeiture is not raised in a court of this State at the time of a finding of guilt, entry of guilty plea or sentencing, a forfeiture of public office, position or employment required by this section may be ordered by a court of this State upon application of the county prosecutor or the Attorney General or upon application of the public officer or public entity having authority to remove the person convicted from his public office, position or employment. The fact that a court has declined to order forfeiture shall not preclude the public officer or public entity having authority to remove the person convicted from seeking to remove or suspend the person from his office, position or employment on the ground that the conduct giving rise to the conviction demonstrates that the person is unfit to hold the office, position or employment.

Amended 1979, c.388, s.3; 1981, c.290, s.42; 1981, c.356, s.1; 1987, c.427, s.1; 1995, c.250; 2003, c.145, s.1; 2007, c.49, s.5.

2C:52-1. Definition of expungement - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:52-1 (2013)
a. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, expungement shall mean the extraction and isolation of all records on file within any court, detention or correctional facility, law enforcement or criminal justice agency concerning a person's detection, apprehension, arrest, detention, trial or disposition of an offense within the criminal justice system.

b. Expunged records shall include complaints, warrants, arrests, commitments, processing records, fingerprints, photographs, index cards, "rap sheets" and judicial docket records.

L.1979, c. 178, s. 108, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:52-2 Indictable offenses. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:52-2 (2013)

2C:52-2. Indictable Offenses.

a.In all cases, except as herein provided, wherein a person has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this State and who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, whether within this State or any other jurisdiction, and has not been adjudged a disorderly person or petty disorderly person on more than two occasions may, after the expiration of a period of 10 years from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or release from incarceration, whichever is later, present a duly verified petition as provided in section 2C:52-7 to the Superior Court in the county in which the conviction was entered praying that such conviction and all records and information pertaining thereto be expunged.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a petition may be filed and presented, and the court may grant an expungement pursuant to this section, although less than 10 years has expired in accordance with the requirements of the preceding paragraph where the court finds:

(1)less than 10 years has expired from the satisfaction of a fine, but the 10-year time requirement is otherwise satisfied, and the court finds that the person substantially complied with any payment plan ordered pursuant to N.J.S.2C:46-1 et seq., or could not do so due to compelling circumstances affecting his ability to satisfy the fine; or

(2)at least five years has expired from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or release from incarceration, whichever is later; the person has not been convicted of a crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly persons offense since the time of the conviction; and the court finds in its discretion that expungement is in the public interest, giving due consideration to the nature of the offense, and the applicant's character and conduct since conviction.

In determining whether compelling circumstances exist for the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, a court may consider the amount of the fine or fines imposed, the person's age at the time of the offense, the person's financial condition and other relevant circumstances regarding the person's ability to pay.

Although subsequent convictions for no more than two disorderly or petty disorderly offenses shall not be an absolute bar to relief, the nature of those conviction or convictions and the circumstances surrounding them shall be considered by the court and may be a basis for denial of relief if they or either of them constitute a continuation of the type of unlawful activity embodied in the criminal conviction for which expungement is sought.

b.Records of conviction pursuant to statutes repealed by this Code for the crimes of murder, manslaughter, treason, anarchy, kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, arson, perjury, false swearing, robbery, embracery, or a conspiracy or any attempt to commit any of the foregoing, or aiding, assisting or concealing persons accused of the foregoing crimes, shall not be expunged.

Records of conviction for the following crimes specified in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice shall not be subject to expungement: Section 2C:11-1 et seq. (Criminal Homicide), except death by auto as specified in section 2C:11-5; section 2C:13-1 (Kidnapping); section 2C:13-6 (Luring or Enticing); section 1 of P.L.2005, c.77 (C.2C:13-8) (Human Trafficking); section 2C:14-2 (Aggravated Sexual Assault); section 2C:14-3a (Aggravated Criminal Sexual Contact); if the victim is a minor, section 2C:14-3b (Criminal Sexual Contact); if the victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim, section 2C:13-2 (Criminal Restraint) or section 2C:13-3 (False Imprisonment); section 2C:15-1 (Robbery); section 2C:17-1 (Arson and Related Offenses); section 2C:24-4a. (Endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the child); section 2C:24-4b(4) (Endangering the welfare of a child); section 2C:24-4b. (3) (Causing or permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act); section 2C:24-4b.(5)(a) (Selling or manufacturing child pornography); section 2C:28-1 (Perjury); section 2C:28-2 (False Swearing); section 2C:34-1b.(4) (Knowingly promoting the prostitution of the actor's child); section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2) (Terrorism); subsection a. of section 3 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-3) (Producing or Possessing Chemical Weapons, Biological Agents or Nuclear or Radiological Devices); and conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.

Records of conviction for any crime committed by a person holding any public office, position or employment, elective or appointive, under the government of this State or any agency or political subdivision thereof and any conspiracy or attempt to commit such a crime shall not be subject to expungement if the crime involved or touched such office, position or employment.

c.In the case of conviction for the sale or distribution of a controlled dangerous substance or possession thereof with intent to sell, expungement shall be denied except where the crimes involve:

(1)Marijuana, where the total quantity sold, distributed or possessed with intent to sell was 25 grams or less;

(2)Hashish, where the total quantity sold, distributed or possessed with intent to sell was five grams or less; or

(3)Any controlled dangerous substance provided that the conviction is of the third or fourth degree, where the court finds that expungement is consistent with the public interest, giving due consideration to the nature of the offense and the petitioner's character and conduct since conviction.

d.In the case of a State licensed physician or podiatrist convicted of an offense involving drugs or alcohol or pursuant to section 14 or 15 of P.L.1989, c.300 (C.2C:21-20 or 2C:21-4.1), the court shall notify the State Board of Medical Examiners upon receipt of a petition for expungement of the conviction and records and information pertaining thereto.

Amended 1989, c.300, s.23; 1993, c.301; 1994, c.133, s.6; 2009, c.188, s.1.

2C:52-4. Ordinances
In all cases wherein a person has been found guilty of violating a municipal ordinance of any governmental entity of this State and who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, whether within this State or any other jurisdiction, and who has not been adjudged a disorderly person or petty disorderly person on more than two occasions, may, after the expiration of a period of 2 years from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or release from incarceration, whichever is later, present a duly verified petition as provided in section 2C:52-7 herein to the Superior Court in the county in which the violation occurred praying that such conviction and all records and information pertaining thereto be expunged.

L.1979, c. 178, s. 111, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.

2C:52-27. Effect of expungement - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:52-27 (2013)

Unless otherwise provided by law, if an order of expungement is granted, the arrest, conviction and any proceedings related thereto shall be deemed not to have occurred, and the petitioner may answer any questions relating to their occurrence accordingly, except as follows:

a. The fact of an expungement, sealing or similar relief shall be disclosed as provided in section 2C:52-8b.

b. The fact of an expungement of prior charges which were dismissed because of the person's acceptance into and successful completion of a supervisory treatment or other diversion program shall be disclosed by said person to any judge who is determining the propriety of accepting said person into a supervisory treatment or other diversion program for subsequent criminal charges; and

c. Information divulged on expunged records shall be revealed by a petitioner seeking employment within the judicial branch or with a law enforcement or corrections agency and such information shall continue to provide a disability as otherwise provided by law.

L.1979, c. 178, s. 134, eff. Sept. 1, 1979. Amended by L.1981, c. 290, s. 45, eff. Sept. 24, 1981.

2C:58-3 Purchase of firearms. - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:58-3 (2013)

2C:58-3. a. Permit to purchase a handgun. No person shall sell, give, transfer, assign or otherwise dispose of, nor receive, purchase, or otherwise acquire a handgun unless the purchaser, assignee, donee, receiver or holder is licensed as a dealer under this chapter or has first secured a permit to purchase a handgun as provided by this section.

b.Firearms purchaser identification card. No person shall sell, give, transfer, assign or otherwise dispose of nor receive, purchase or otherwise acquire an antique cannon or a rifle or shotgun, other than an antique rifle or shotgun, unless the purchaser, assignee, donee, receiver or holder is licensed as a dealer under this chapter or possesses a valid firearms purchaser identification card, and first exhibits said card to the seller, donor, transferor or assignor, and unless the purchaser, assignee, donee, receiver or holder signs a written certification, on a form prescribed by the superintendent, which shall indicate that he presently complies with the requirements of subsection c. of this section and shall contain his name, address and firearms purchaser identification card number or dealer's registration number. The said certification shall be retained by the seller, as provided in paragraph (4) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:58-2, or, in the case of a person who is not a dealer, it may be filed with the chief of police of the municipality in which he resides or with the superintendent.

c.Who may obtain. No person of good character and good repute in the community in which he lives, and who is not subject to any of the disabilities set forth in this section or other sections of this chapter, shall be denied a permit to purchase a handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card, except as hereinafter set forth. No handgun purchase permit or firearms purchaser identification card shall be issued:

(1)To any person who has been convicted of any crime, or a disorderly persons offense involving an act of domestic violence as defined in section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), whether or not armed with or possessing a weapon at the time of such offense;

(2)To any drug dependent person as defined in section 2 of P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-2), to any person who is confined for a mental disorder to a hospital, mental institution or sanitarium, or to any person who is presently an habitual drunkard;

(3)To any person who suffers from a physical defect or disease which would make it unsafe for him to handle firearms, to any person who has ever been confined for a mental disorder, or to any alcoholic unless any of the foregoing persons produces a certificate of a medical doctor or psychiatrist licensed in New Jersey, or other satisfactory proof, that he is no longer suffering from that particular disability in such a manner that would interfere with or handicap him in the handling of firearms; to any person who knowingly falsifies any information on the application form for a handgun purchase permit or firearms purchaser identification card;

(4)To any person under the age of 18 years for a firearms purchaser identification card and to any person under the age of 21 years for a permit to purchase a handgun;

(5)To any person where the issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare;

(6)To any person who is subject to a restraining order issued pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et seq.) prohibiting the person from possessing any firearm;

(7)To any person who as a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for an offense which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime and the offense involved the unlawful use or possession of a weapon, explosive or destructive device or is enumerated in subsection d. of section 2 of P.L.1997, c.117 (C.2C:43-7.2); or

(8)To any person whose firearm is seized pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et seq.) and whose firearm has not been returned.

d.Issuance. The chief of police of an organized full-time police department of the municipality where the applicant resides or the superintendent, in all other cases, shall upon application, issue to any person qualified under the provisions of subsection c. of this section a permit to purchase a handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card.

Any person aggrieved by the denial of a permit or identification card may request a hearing in the Superior Court of the county in which he resides if he is a resident of New Jersey or in the Superior Court of the county in which his application was filed if he is a nonresident. The request for a hearing shall be made in writing within 30 days of the denial of the application for a permit or identification card. The applicant shall serve a copy of his request for a hearing upon the chief of police of the municipality in which he resides, if he is a resident of New Jersey, and upon the superintendent in all cases. The hearing shall be held and a record made thereof within 30 days of the receipt of the application for such hearing by the judge of the Superior Court. No formal pleading and no filing fee shall be required as a preliminary to such hearing. Appeals from the results of such hearing shall be in accordance with law.

e.Applications. Applications for permits to purchase a handgun and for firearms purchaser identification cards shall be in the form prescribed by the superintendent and shall set forth the name, residence, place of business, age, date of birth, occupation, sex and physical description, including distinguishing physical characteristics, if any, of the applicant, and shall state whether the applicant is a citizen, whether he is an alcoholic, habitual drunkard, drug dependent person as defined in section 2 of P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-2), whether he has ever been confined or committed to a mental institution or hospital for treatment or observation of a mental or psychiatric condition on a temporary, interim or permanent basis, giving the name and location of the institution or hospital and the dates of such confinement or commitment, whether he has been attended, treated or observed by any doctor or psychiatrist or at any hospital or mental institution on an inpatient or outpatient basis for any mental or psychiatric condition, giving the name and location of the doctor, psychiatrist, hospital or institution and the dates of such occurrence, whether he presently or ever has been a member of any organization which advocates or approves the commission of acts of force and violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or of this State, or which seeks to deny others their rights under the Constitution of either the United States or the State of New Jersey, whether he has ever been convicted of a crime or disorderly persons offense, whether the person is subject to a restraining order issued pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et seq.) prohibiting the person from possessing any firearm, and such other information as the superintendent shall deem necessary for the proper enforcement of this chapter. For the purpose of complying with this subsection, the applicant shall waive any statutory or other right of confidentiality relating to institutional confinement. The application shall be signed by the applicant and shall contain as references the names and addresses of two reputable citizens personally acquainted with him.

Application blanks shall be obtainable from the superintendent, from any other officer authorized to grant such permit or identification card, and from licensed retail dealers.

The chief police officer or the superintendent shall obtain the fingerprints of the applicant and shall have them compared with any and all records of fingerprints in the municipality and county in which the applicant resides and also the records of the State Bureau of Identification and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, provided that an applicant for a handgun purchase permit who possesses a valid firearms purchaser identification card, or who has previously obtained a handgun purchase permit from the same licensing authority for which he was previously fingerprinted, and who provides other reasonably satisfactory proof of his identity, need not be fingerprinted again; however, the chief police officer or the superintendent shall proceed to investigate the application to determine whether or not the applicant has become subject to any of the disabilities set forth in this chapter.

f.Granting of permit or identification card; fee; term; renewal; revocation. The application for the permit to purchase a handgun together with a fee of $2, or the application for the firearms purchaser identification card together with a fee of $5, shall be delivered or forwarded to the licensing authority who shall investigate the same and, unless good cause for the denial thereof appears, shall grant the permit or the identification card, or both, if application has been made therefor, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the application for residents of this State and within 45 days for nonresident applicants. A permit to purchase a handgun shall be valid for a period of 90 days from the date of issuance and may be renewed by the issuing authority for good cause for an additional 90 days. A firearms purchaser identification card shall be valid until such time as the holder becomes subject to any of the disabilities set forth in subsection c. of this section, whereupon the card shall be void and shall be returned within five days by the holder to the superintendent, who shall then advise the licensing authority. Failure of the holder to return the firearms purchaser identification card to the superintendent within the said five days shall be an offense under subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:39-10. Any firearms purchaser identification card may be revoked by the Superior Court of the county wherein the card was issued, after hearing upon notice, upon a finding that the holder thereof no longer qualifies for the issuance of such permit. The county prosecutor of any county, the chief police officer of any municipality or any citizen may apply to such court at any time for the revocation of such card.

There shall be no conditions or requirements added to the form or content of the application, or required by the licensing authority for the issuance of a permit or identification card, other than those that are specifically set forth in this chapter.

g.Disposition of fees. All fees for permits shall be paid to the State Treasury if the permit is issued by the superintendent, to the municipality if issued by the chief of police, and to the county treasurer if issued by the judge of the Superior Court.

h.Form of permit; quadruplicate; disposition of copies. The permit shall be in the form prescribed by the superintendent and shall be issued to the applicant in quadruplicate. Prior to the time he receives the handgun from the seller, the applicant shall deliver to the seller the permit in quadruplicate and the seller shall complete all of the information required on the form. Within five days of the date of the sale, the seller shall forward the original copy to the superintendent and the second copy to the chief of police of the municipality in which the purchaser resides, except that in a municipality having no chief of police, such copy shall be forwarded to the superintendent. The third copy shall then be returned to the purchaser with the pistol or revolver and the fourth copy shall be kept by the seller as a permanent record.

i.Restriction on number of firearms person may purchase. Only one handgun shall be purchased or delivered on each permit and no more than one handgun shall be purchased within any 30-day period, but this limitation shall not apply to:

(1)a federal, State or local law enforcement officer or agency purchasing handguns for use by officers in the actual performance of their law enforcement duties;

(2)a collector of handguns as curios or relics as defined in Title 18, United States Code, section 921 (a) (13) who has in his possession a valid Collector of Curios and Relics License issued by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives;

(3)transfers of handguns among licensed retail dealers, registered wholesale dealers and registered manufacturers

(4)transfers of handguns from any person to a licensed retail dealer or a registered wholesale dealer or registered manufacturer.

(5)any transaction where the person has purchased a handgun from a licensed retail dealer and has returned that handgun to the dealer in exchange for another handgun within 30 days of the original transaction, provided the retail dealer reports the exchange transaction to the superintendent; or

(6)any transaction where the superintendent issues an exemption from the prohibition in this subsection pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of P.L.2009, c.186 (C.2C:58-3.4).

The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to afford or authorize any other exemption from the regulatory provisions governing firearms set forth in chapter 39 and chapter 58 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes;

A person shall not be restricted as to the number of rifles or shotguns he may purchase, provided he possesses a valid firearms purchaser identification card and provided further that he signs the certification required in subsection b. of this section for each transaction.

j.Firearms passing to heirs or legatees. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section concerning the transfer, receipt or acquisition of a firearm, a permit to purchase or a firearms purchaser identification card shall not be required for the passing of a firearm upon the death of an owner thereof to his heir or legatee, whether the same be by testamentary bequest or by the laws of intestacy. The person who shall so receive, or acquire said firearm shall, however, be subject to all other provisions of this chapter. If the heir or legatee of such firearm does not qualify to possess or carry it, he may retain ownership of the firearm for the purpose of sale for a period not exceeding 180 days, or for such further limited period as may be approved by the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which the heir or legatee resides or the superintendent, provided that such firearm is in the custody of the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality or the superintendent during such period.

k.Sawed-off shotguns. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the purchase or possession of any sawed-off shotgun.

l.Nothing in this section and in N.J.S.2C:58-2 shall apply to the sale or purchase of a visual distress signalling device approved by the United States Coast Guard, solely for possession on a private or commercial aircraft or any boat; provided, however, that no person under the age of 18 years shall purchase nor shall any person sell to a person under the age of 18 years such a visual distress signalling device.

Amended 1979, c.179, s.11; 1981, c.363, s.2; 1982, c.173, s.2; 1983, c.479, s.4; 1991, c.261, s.19; 2000, c.145, s.1; 2001, c.3, s.1; 2003, c.73; 2003, c.277, s.4; 2009, c.104, s.2; 2009, c.186, s.2.

2C:104-4. Arrest with warrant - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:104-4 (2013)
2C:104-4 Arrest With Warrant.

a. If there is clear and convincing evidence that the person named in the application will not be available as a witness unless immediately arrested, the judge may issue an arrest warrant. The arrest warrant shall require that the person be brought before the court immediately after arrest. If the arrest does not take place during regular court hours, the person shall be brought to the emergency-duty Superior Court judge.

b. The judge shall inform the person of:

(1) the reason for arrest;

(2) the time and place of the hearing to determine whether the person is a material witness; and

(3) the right to an attorney and to have an attorney appointed if the person cannot afford one.

c. The judge shall set conditions for release, or if there is clear and convincing evidence that the person will not be available as a witness unless confined, the judge may order the person confined until the material witness hearing which shall take place within 48 hours of the arrest.

Source: 2A:162-2.

L.1994,c.126,s.4.

2C:104-5. Arrest without warrant - Universal Citation: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:104-5 (2013)
2C:104-5 Arrest Without Warrant.

a. A law enforcement officer may arrest an alleged material witness without a warrant only if the arrest occurs prior to the filing of an indictment, accusation or complaint for a crime or the initiation of a criminal investigation before a grand jury, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that:

(1) a crime has been committed;

(2) the alleged material witness has information material to the prosecution of that crime;

(3) the alleged material witness will refuse to cooperate with the officer in the investigation of that crime; and

(4) the delay necessary to obtain an arrest warrant or order to appear would result in the unavailability of the alleged material witness.

b. Following the warrantless arrest of an alleged material witness, the law enforcement officer shall bring the person immediately before a judge. If court is not in session, the officer shall immediately bring the person before the emergency-duty Superior Court judge. The judge shall determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person is a material witness of a crime and, if an indictment, accusation or complaint for that crime has not issued or if a grand jury has not commenced a criminal investigation of that crime, the judge shall determine whether there is probable cause to believe that, within 48 hours of the arrest, an indictment, accusation or complaint will issue or a grand jury investigation will commence. The judge then shall proceed as if an application for a warrant has been made under N.J.S.2C:104-4.

Source: New.

L.1994,c.126,s.5.

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